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 BUREAUCRACY AND PEASANTRY IN DECENTRALIZATION IN BHUTAN1
Karma Ura2
I. INTRODUCTION 
This essay is an attempt to provide mainly a detailed descriptive view of the various 
forces and views affecting decentralization in Bhutan. The issues are, however, more general 
and represents those faced in other countries as well. The essay gives both historical and 
structural backgrounds to decentralization. Emphasizing decentralization as a continuity, 
Section II sketches the state of non-centralized structure of Bhutan in pre-modern time while 
striving for its secure existence as an independent country. It is too obvious to state that 
Bhutan is different today, just as it became different with every evolution it went through, but 
the fundamental nature of a balanced relationship between the state and society that each 
generation seeks to strike is not new at all. Reading of past in this respect is not without 
lessons. Section III presents an overview of current national and international impetus for 
decentralization. It reviews the concept and practice of participation and decentralization in 
countries under various political systems, from communism to liberal democracies. It then 
elaborates His Majesty the King of Bhutan’s remarkable strides towards devolution and 
decentralization in Bhutan that began quite early in comparison with similar  initatives in 
many developing countries. Section IV discusses the contested concepts of empowerment and 
autonomy in different theoretical traditions and what they imply when translated in actions for 
decentralization in the context of Bhutan. Section V, which is relatively short, considers the 
desireable balance in participation and representation in decision-making and decision 
legitimizations among different participating groups such as bureaucrats, political 
representatives and the people.   
The purpose of decentralization is ultimately interpreted in terms of value pluralism that 
permits diversity 3 . However, diversity and value pluralism are not easy to be analysed 
comfortably within continuum of centralization and decentralization of authority. It seems 
that dichotomous concepts of centralisation and decentralization does not accommodate fully 
a discussion of value pluralism and diversity.  Interspersed with theoretical digressions and 
personal obervations of decentralization related events in Bhutan, it hopes to be a constructive 
debate about deeper issues for wider critical reflection that could turn decentralization 
towards diversity as its central value. The essay is not explicitly normative to offer practical 
financial, political and administrative programmatic recommendations. I intend, however, to 
prepare a separate attachment offering practical recommendations in line with the conceptual 
                                                 
1 I am very grateful for their intellectual generousity to four individuals for their beneficial criticism and 
responsive comments on the draft of this essay, which made substantial differences to the final version. I would 
like to express my gratitude to Mayumi Murayama, Mark Mancall, Peter Hershock and John Ardussi for their 
painstakingly detailed suggestions. Not all of these suggestions could be synthesized and incorporated. In a 
separate publication, their critical commentaries that I have requested them to contribute will appear with the 
essay.   
2 Visiting Research Fellow, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE) JETRO, Chiba-shi, Japan;  and 
Director, Centre for Bhutan Studies, Thimphu, Bhutan. (drphilos@yahoo.co.uk). I thank IDE for hosting me to 
write this and other essays. 
3 Peter Hershock contrasts divesity with variety. Variety is to a zoo what diversity is to an ecological 
system. In a zoo, animals do not contribute to each other. They are merely present together in a close physical 
space. In an ecology, each member contributes to the other in a web of contributory relationship. An increase in 
variety does not lead to diversity which is a pattern of meaningful relationship. I am thankful for his contribution 
on this distinction. 
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suppositions in the essay for the consideration of those engaged in planning decentralization 
in Bhutan. 
II. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: LOCAL-CENTRE RELATIONS 
This section is an attempt to draw historical argument for decentralization. Ahistorical 
arguments for decentralization are usually a type of universalist discourse relating to 
something as relevant everywhere at all times. When the theoretical structure of 
decentralization argument are strongly and exclusively based on frameworks written and 
espoused by international development institutions, such ahistorical justifications fail to relate 
to contingent and local thinking in which history, albeit selective consciousness of historical 
events, still guides imaginative possibilities of the future. The belief that sovereignty was 
centralised and unitary is only half-true. By offering an account of the decentralised nature of 
polity of Bhutanese government in the past, this section brings past pluralism (in many 
spheres such as customary law, organisations, civil service, economic production, 
associational life, religious orders and so forth) as a relevant image for today’s effort at 
decentralization. Underneath all such pluralism is value pluralism. No single value seems to 
have been dominant except the progressively germinating Buddhist values, including those 
associated with respect for life ie., the value of flourishing of all life, not only human. It 
shows that the past Bhutan existed through a diversity of forms of life found in all kinds of 
communal variations, and that decentralization today can sustain and revive that heterogeinty, 
without weakening the country. The building of the unity of the country must look also to the 
past, when the country stood-united in the midst of pluralism and when there was far less 
common history, common language and common culture than today.  
An archetype, political mythology in Bhutan4 found in some of the writings of major 
contemporary traditional authors (Pema Tshewang 1987, Nado 1986) evoke the well 
rehearsed successional stages in political evolution that we come across also in 
anthropological literature: existence of conflict, search for external leadership, miraculous 
appearance of heaven-linked child empowered to rule by predestination, exercise of political 
authority, rule for general benefit (Roscoe 1993). Centralisation of power is implicated in this 
schematised explanation as a means of controlling violence and conflict among a people who 
cannot resolve it internally among themselves. One can interpret this archetype as 
legitimisation of centralisation of power to limit social conflict produced by mutually 
opposing powers of oppression and resistance.5  
For the establishment of the Zhabdrung’s rule by unifying and centralising political 
power, prophetic revelations were seen as the key legitimation. Ardussi (2000:7) quotes 
Tsang Khan-chen, the biographer of Zhabdrung,  for a prophecy by Guru Rinpoche. 6  
Likewise, in his Lhoi Chojung, Geshey Gedun Rinchen cites a prohecy that was based on 
earlier hagiographies (Gedun Rinchen 1972, ff. 213-214).7 He gives critical supernatural 
factor for unification and centralisation of power by the first Zhabdrung in terms of the 
                                                 
4 The earliest myth about which both Lama Nado and Lama Pemala have written is concerned with the 
descent of heavenly son as a king of Ura valley. 
5 Social conflict is evidence that both forces are present, since neither oppression nor resistance on its 
own can generate conflict. It is also evidence of freedom in a way, for it implies space for change. 
6  See Ardussi (2000:7). His excerpts of the prophecy from gTsang mKhan-chen’s biography of 
Zhabdrung reads: “Lho rong lho sgo bas mthar bsti gnas tshol // de ltar byas na bod yul mi lo bdun // bsgom 
bsgrub byas las gnas der zhag bdun sgrub thag nye // (citing a gter-ma text called Gsang ba nor bu’i thig le’i 
rgyud.  
7 See Gedun Rinchen  (1972), pp 213-214. He cites several prophecies. The first one is attributed to Guru 
Rinpoche. The second one is a prophecy from bdud ‘dul gter lung which foretold that a reincarnation of Naropa 
named Ngawang will rule khazhi. The third pre-destination, he cites, consists in the words and prophecies left by 
Choje Tsangpa Jarey, the founder of Durkpa Kagyu school of Buddhism. This can be traced to gTsang 
mKhanchen’s biography of Zhabdrung. 
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implementation (nyer len) of offer of Khazhi Lhoi Gyalkhab (name for Bhutan in those days) 
as the field of taming (gdul byai zhing du phul) by his protector deity Yeshey Gonpo during 
the Zhabdrung’s meditation.Usual meanings of the word gdul, which is bound to religious 
semantics,  are training and conquering human mind towards peace. Thus the Zhabdrung’s 
undertaking to unify Bhutan can be ultimately understood as a means of integrating the 
country into a scheme of training to control the unruliness of human mind that generates 
suffering and conflict. In an vitally important and wide-ranging article on the founding of the 
country in ealry 17th century, Ardussi (2000:5-6) points out that in 1625/26 when the 
Zhabdrung came out of his meditation, he chose the course of founding a new state as the 
Sakya ‘Phag-pa did in Tibet to elaborate autonomy within Sakya-Mongol alliance, though 
Ardussi notes that the rule of Zhabdrung was also different from Sakya-Mongol relationship 
because the Zhabdrung was independent of an overlord. The lack of his success to find a way 
to regain Ra-lung’s abbotical seat favoured this course, in addition to the visionary signs 
shown him by sacred image of Avalokitesvara and his then deceased father  Tenpai Nyima.8 
In what Ardussi (2000:11) calls “the Buddhist equivalent of a ‘Social Contract’, the practical 
justifications of founding of the state of Bhutan under the Zhabdrung was elaborated by his 
biographer Tsang Khan-chen as: 
 
“The happiness of sentient beings is dependent on the teachings of the Buddha, whereas the 
teachings of the Buddha, too, are dependent on the happiness of the world.”9
 
Rationalising the 1729 legal code, Desi Mipham Wangpo likewise relates the concept of 
laws, happiness of the sentient beings, and the state: 
 
“Sentient beings cannot obtain happiness without laws, and if there is no happiness, there is no 
purpose in holding the Choje Drukpa’s two-fold laws.”10
 
In the case of holding power by hereditary kingship, prophecies as well as rational 
arguments were invoked. Only rational justification was invoked in the famous public 
document of consent addressed to lugs gnyis khrims bdag Gongsar Ugyen Wangchuck, then 
technically Trongsa Penlop. The document sponsoring and pledging allegiance was signed by 
key individuals functioning in 1907 in the traditional tripartite system of the state, who were 
categorised as the monk body, the subjects and the high officials of various regions and the 
central government.  In this document, which is the centrepiece of consensual procedure 
establishing the monarchy in Bhutan, centralisation of power in the monarch is presented as a 
necessity to control social conflict generating trouble and hardship (dab sig) for the Bhutanese 
people. Interestingly, Ugyen Wangchuck is addressed as lugs gnyis khrims bdag, a compound 
phrase that can be translated as lord of laws. It suggests that the holder of power is the source 
of law and social justice taking khrims in the widest sense of its meaning. Ardussi shows that 
                                                 
8 Ardussi bases his interpretations on gTsang mKhan-chen ’Jam-dbyangs dPal-ldan rGya-mtsho (c.1675). 
Dpal ’brug pa rin po che ngag dbang rnam rgyal gyi rnam par thar pa rgyas pa chos kyi sprin chen po’i dbyangs, 
in 5 parts (Ka   Ca) and a supplement (Cha). Reprint by Topden Tshering entitled The Detailed Biography of the 
First zhabs drung Rinpoche of Bhutan Ngag dbang rnam rgyal (Ngag-dbang-bdud-’joms-rdo rje) (Dolanji, 1974, 
from the Punakha woodblocks of ca. 1797 1802). 
9 See Ardussi 2000 p.11 who quotes from gTsang mKhan-chen (Cha). 119.a: “de nas yang sems can gyi 
bde skyid sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa la rag las pa dang / sangs rgyas kyi bstan pa’ang ’jig rten gyi bde skyid la 
rag la / de phyir lugs gnyis kyi khrims / byang chub sems dpa’i spyod yul gyi thabs kyis yul rnam par ’phrul pa 
bstan pa’i mdo dang / ’khor lo bcu brda sprod pa chen po’i mdo las ’byung ba ltar legs par bca’ ba mdzad de /.  
10 Legal Code dated 1729 (earth bird year) attributed to the 10th Desi Mipham Wangpo while serving on 
the Golden Throne of Bhutan, as representative of the Shabdrung Rinpoche. Extracted from Rje Mkhan-po 10, 
Bstan ’dzin Chos rgyal, Lho'i chos 'byung bstan pa rin po che'i 'phro mthud 'jam mgon smon mtha'i 'phreng ba 
zhes bya ba. Written during the years 1755-59. The original text reads as “khrims med na sems can la bde skyid 
mi 'byung / sems can la bde skyid med na chos rje 'brug pas lugs gnyis kyi bstan pa 'dzin pa'i don med cing /” 
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the concept of lugs gnyis as royal laws (rgyal khrims) and religious laws (chos khrims) has its 
earliest source in a poem written by Nyang-ral Nyi-ma ‘od-zer (late 12th century).11
While these examples of investing power in an absolute sense in the body of a sovereign 
suggest that Bhutan was a centralised polity, actual centralised control could have been very 
limited for various reasons.  
In liberal political system, the concept of tri-partite separation of power and federalism 
is designed to provide check and balance, and prevent centralisation of power in any single 
locus. In the separation of power  through organizational check and balance, the excesses that 
may arise if power is invested within one centre is  controlled externally by a conscious 
design in structures and functions. How could Bhutanese state where such constitutional 
design was absent historically avoid tyranny, if any? To answer this, we have to resort to a 
well-rooted concept in the local milieu that contrast with the tri-partite separation of power. 
The local concept depends on a realization of three capacities within individual leaders to 
avoid arising of despotism. This concept that may have been internalised by national 
leadership who rose out of monastic ranks most probably contributed to strivings for civilized 
rule and, circumstantially, made possible the harmonization or union of religious  views and 
political views in governance. These are: (1) khyen pai ye shes (wisdom and compassion), (2) 
brtse ba’i thugs rje  (immeasurable loving kindness), and (3) nus pa’i stobs  (power of 
strength). Together, these three are popularly known as mkhyen brtse nus gsum.  This triad of 
knowledge, loving kindness and power are classical Buddhist qualities perceived as necessary 
in any leader. Power exercised in isolation can easily be unconstrained without the other two. 
Balance radiates from such a developed leader because power element is restrained by loving 
kindness felt towards all sentient beings and is directed by the wisdom-knowledge. Exercise 
of any power (legislative, executive, judicial) in isolation of the two other elements of 
compassion and loving kindness (of the four immeasureables) will then be destabilizing.12 
Implicit in this combination of three classical qualities necessary in a leader is also a view that 
no external entity or agency can enforce balance and equilibrium in a society unless the 
individuals within the leadership strata, or every entity for that matter, acquires these three 
internal characteristics. I would argue that besides other contraints taken up below, state 
power was limited by these restraining values. 
It can be argued that the traditional Bhutanese polity was highly centralised in placing 
its households into an elaborate hierarchy of tax and labour service performers, and in 
maintenance of security (foreign and defence policies) but decentralised in all other respects. 
Even defence and national security depended on decentralised coordination. Maintenance of 
national security was not based on centralized command and control of a standing army which 
would have resulted in even a greater degree of absorption of resources dependent on labour 
and in-kind taxation. Furthermore, it would seem from cursory reading of Bhutanese history 
that various competitors for power, like the Zhabdrung incarnates, penlops (regional 
governors), high state officials of the centres, and the central monastic body, druk desis (civil 
administrator-in-chief of the country), and well-known independent religious orders, left the 
country in a state of plural power centres, with intermittent negotiation and constant counter 
balance with each other. Evidence for such decentralized structure is also found in Tibet with 
whom Bhutan had wide intercultural, economic and political interactions. Samuel Geoffrey 
(1982) has argued that in the case of Tibetan state, only in central Tibet where sedentary 
agriculture was developed, political control was centralised. In  other areas, central control 
                                                 
11 Ardussi mentions that the referent text can be found on page 13 of Law Code of Karma bsTan-skyong 
dBang-po = Gtsang sde srid karma bstan skyong dbang pos bod la dbang sgyur byed skabs spel ser ba sgrig tu 
bcug pa’i khrims yig zhal lce bcu drug. Contained in Tshe-ring bDe-skyid, ed. (1987). Bod kyi dus rabs rim 
byung gi khrims yig phyogs bsdus dwangs byed ke ta ka. Lhasa: Bod ljongs mi dmangs dpe skrun khang, pp. 13-
76. 
12 Philosopher Martha Nussbaum has argued that compassion needs to be raised at two levels: “that of 
individual psychology and institutional design.” See Eynde Maria Vanden for a disscussion of Nussbaum’s 
Work on Compassion from a Buddhist Perspective on http://jde.gold.ac.uk 
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left autonomy to local political structures. The central government of Tibet granted fiscal 
concessions to local powers consisting of local aristocrats and monasteries, but these 
concessions, he writes, did not amount to political centralization as in Europe in medieval 
times. 
But the issues of taxation and social differentiations, and security and leadership 
competition are not the direct focus here; I am interested here only to suggest that beyond the 
realm of material extraction, through labour services and in-kind taxation, conditioned of 
course by wider ideologies that shape the relationship between state and the individuals it 
encompasses, the presence of state in other domains of life was far less. Of course, there is a 
big unanswered question of to what degree the burden of material appropriations displace 
‘immaterial’ freedoms. The reach of Bhutanese state into various sectors of life seems to have 
been faint in all other times except when realizing heavy obligations of transporting and 
delivering a miscellany of in-kind taxes through a vast array of labour services by every fiscal 
unit (usually those defined as tax paying household). Rural cash taxes have been lowered to a 
nominal level by the present His Majesty the King to enable generation of a higher disposable 
income for the peasantry. The issue of labour services, whether one calls it project-beneficiary 
contributions, zhaptolemi or woola 13 , however, has still a great deal of contemporary 
resonance in gewogs. It is not so in urban areas where such contributions do not exists, thus 
making urban areas free from such institutional arrangements of labour mobilisation, an 
important theme I will take up in an forthcoming research paper. Interviews of old villagers 
and government officials also suggest that the bureaucratic apparatus in peaceful times 
functioned primarily to coordinate, collect and maintain the regularity of delivery of in-kind 
taxes to various centres of their shares in the tax revenues. Aristocratic centres of powers and 
the monastic institutions owned agricultural land on which the peasantry not only worked to 
cultivate on sharecropping, but also processed the harvest, and transported the output over 
long distances.14 There was no effective check on the tax collectors; oral interviews generally 
confirm that they added to the volume of tax collected so that a portion could be appropriated 
as theirs. These type of additions ranged from money to textiles to bullocks. The unauthorized 
extraction of resources and labour seem to have taken place in spite of the prohibition on an 
extensive list of things written into a legal code as early as 172915. 
But political centralisation for fiscal mobilisation (labour and material) did not go 
entirely unchallenged or resisted. Relocation and transfer of allegiance from one power centre 
to another through suma-shi16 for example, made political centralisation difficult. Burden of 
taxation that reduced communities to more subsistence led many sections of communities in 
different parts of the country to relocate themselves in more removed locations of the country 
to escape taxation. In this respect, being mobile, nomadic, or on the margin of agriculture as 
pam-people17 left individuals more free from exactitude of labour and in kind taxes. Oral 
interviews confirm that many villages18 were founded by those who desisted taxation and 
                                                 
13 Zhaptolemi and woola means practically the same. The term zhaptolemi was coined in the 1960s to 
mean contribution of labour to local infrastructure contructions such as schools, dispensaries and water supply 
schemes. Woola is an ancient term of labour requisition.  
14 Tambiah, based on work on Sri Linkan Buddhism prevalent in the precolonial period, has qualified that 
such monastic landlordism was a material necessity rather than wealth seeking and generation (Tambiah 1973, 5). 
15 See Rje Mkhan-po 10, Bstan ’dzin Chos rgyal, Lho'i chos 'byung bstan pa rin po che'i 'phro mthud 'jam 
mgon smon mtha'i 'phreng ba zhes bya ba. Written during the years 1755-59. I am thankful to John Ardussi for 
sending me the extract on 1729 legal code. 
16 Suma refers to fiscal household status which obliged the household to pay tax, often some cash and 
goods, directly to aristocratic families of either Wangdicholing or Lame Gonpa who issued writs confirming this 
status. They ceased to pay tax to the state. Households who paid taxes to the state often transferred their fiscal 
allegiance to these aristocratic families who rose to power in the 19th century. 
17 Farmers who start opening new agriculture land by converting forest into cultivatable land. They are 
often permanent settlers in-the-making. 
18 Leuchugang in Linjay in Kurtoe, a rich rice-growing area was abondoned. Its inhabitants left to evade 
taxation. Meritsemo community was founded by those who left Paga when the Zhabdrung’s new administration 
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went to live in new sites. Interestingly, enclaves and sanctuaries of monasteries provided a 
means of escape from labour services and many people took to living around monasteries in 
their respective districts. The burden of labour sevice resulted also in subversive ecological 
acts such as blocking sources of spa so that the people in the neighbourhoods would not be 
troubled by official decrees to convey goods of official-visitors to the spas.  
A rigorous system of taxation and labour services could have been enforced only in two 
ways: either by coercion or by consent conditioned by a wider notion of social heirarchy. The 
view that it was not coercive can be partly based on the knowledge of who and how many had 
to pay taxes. Tax paying households were precisely defined and documented for such 
collection purposes. There were far fewer taxpayers than we assume today.  In contemporary 
discussions, a simple but highly erroneous extrapolation is made from the present number of 
households to the past number of tax paying households. In traditional polity, the number of 
in-kind tax paying households were just a portion of the total number of households. Thus, the 
impression of tax bases was narrower than it actually was. Labour taxes could be peformed as 
there were more households than those declared as tax paying household. But this was not so 
true in terms of land based taxes as tax was tied to the pre-determined averaged output of the 
land. Each tax payer seemed to have held large areas of lands suggesting of course 
concerntration of land ownership. Tax-paying household units further leased land to non-tax 
paying households. The other way in which one could understand the acceptance of a high 
level of taxation is by an analogy with Buddhist societies which achieved the extraction of 
surplus from peasantry. This can be done by projecting a Buddhist polity in terms of Buddhist 
moral heirarchy (Vandergeest 1993, 884 citing Tambiah 1976).19 In the Buddhist cosmology, 
the state is regarded as the patron of the monastic community. Aristocracy, officials and 
monks subsisting on peasantry support were regarded as examplers of moral conduct who 
produced merit for the society as a whole due to the material support it provided to them. 
Tambiah suggest that this discourse helped in the construction of the Buddhist state, or helped 
in the use of this discourse for material transfer. It does seem to explain to a degree political 
evolution also of Bhutan towards centralisation of a particular kind, and of social economic 
differentiation and status differentiation. 
However, the fact that the Bhutanese society was pedestrian (dependent on walking) 
meant that the state officials were physically limited from penetrating deeply into social as 
well as physical spaces. The constraint of travelling on foot by officials, who cost the state 
money to employ by way of their entitlements (thob), made centralisation less feasible. And 
there was a clear consciousnes that state official needed to be curbed on inflation of their 
entitlements, as indicated by proscriptions contained in 1729 legal code. Pedestrianism meant 
far lesser scope of interaction of state with the people. The other side of the coin is that 
geographical circumscription also trapped the communities in their mountain fastness from 
where it was difficult to break out, if they wished to. But it also offered virgin sites in jungles 
and hidden valleys for new settlements who lived beyond the fiscal yoke for some time, until 
such settlements got registered on the official map. This suggests that technology of 
communication and transport, other things being same, contributes to political centralisation 
and control, and is not neutral.20  
                                                                                                                                                        
tried to integrate into a more rigorous tax system. There are many other villages whose settlement history attests 
to such causes. 
19 Quoting James Scott (1990), Vandergeest remarks, however, that “it is impossible to separate the ideas 
and symbolism of subordination from a process of material exploitation.” 
20 The relationship between political decentralization and technology of transport and communication 
constraints has been a theme under practice theory in anthropology. Roscoe (1993) building on the ideas of 
Bourdieu, Carneiro and Giddens  developed a complex relationship between nucleation and density of settlement 
and politcal centralisation by institutionalisation of power through hierarchical structure of dominance. The key 
concept he pointed out is that “the more they (leaders) can devote to political activity and the less time they need 
to spend on its associated travel, the greater the effect of this and/or extent of their control, and vice versa (italics 
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Given the pedestrian distance that imposed a limit on the frequency and extent of 
interaction between the state and the communities, intense control and regulation by the state 
in Bhutan was infeasible, and this led to a substantial degree of defacto decentralization and 
community autonomy. Customary law, or legal pluralism in today’s vocabulary, prevailed. 
The administrative apparatus of the government was not geared or organised to create 
government-led local political structures or edifices as it is today. The centre did not have 
frequent centrally decreed activities to be regularly communicated to districts and gewogs. 
Neither the local units of administration and associations have locally decided programmes to 
seek funding from the centre nor did it have issues to be addressed to the centre about 
promulgation of nationally binding laws and policies. 
The heirarchical progression of the state officials was from the local towards the centre, 
usually not the other way round. This implies that local officials did not bring a culture of 
centralisation to the locality on their own. The administrative history of Bhutan, as far as one 
can make out from the rolls of positions of dzongpons and penlops, show a linear rise of the 
district officials to the central posts. By what criteria of performance such personages from 
local levels rose to assume more centralised and wide-ranging entitlements at the centre and 
regional positions is still unknown. One can assume to some degree that forceful local leaders 
were accommodated in higher positions.  
Communities were loosely managed by local power groups composed of lineage-
network of local elites. Only above the position of dungpa21 were appointments outside the 
hold of local population. But an important distinction is that district officials such as 
dzongpon and dungpa had local roots. The route to the rise of officials to apex power has 
changed between the traditional polity and modern bureaucracy. Whereas there was ascension 
to levers of state power such as dzongpons and penlops by rise from the geographically 
peripheral posts, the career patterns in the four decades of development history would show 
that the key positions of powers were essentially held by past and current stratum of 
ministerial-leaders who did not stay in the district posts. They were able to land in Thimphu-
based posts on the basis of educational or technical qualification combined with political 
attributes, with some of them replenishing centralistic domestic experience with foreign 
postings or extensive travels abroad.   
The notion of citizenship (as in the membership of a place like city where this notion 
first emerged) in Bhutan was essentially situated in the institutional setting that is local or 
gewog. That is not to say that individuals were not aware about the power and authority of the 
state that was forcefully and regularly impressed upon through labour service system. But an 
individual as a political or social being was embedded more deeply in the community and 
materialised in the community rather than the state. The state in Bhutan did not 
constitutionalize citizenship with formal or legal rights in the sense of citizenship in European 
polities or modern state. 22 Local citizens speaking a babble of their tongues, unlike the 
growing power of English and Dzongkha intended to be new languages of mass 
communication today, conceived and communicated realities of the local world in their own 
                                                                                                                                                        
mine)... In oral, pedestrian societies, in sum, population density and nucleation fundamentally decreased the 
potential for political centralisation. ” 
21 A dungpa is the civil servant heading the administrative territory called dungkhag. In 1746, for 
example, the country was divided into 126 dungkhags, a territorial layer between gewogs and dzongkhags. Most 
of the dungkhags were done away with by the second King. A dozen of these still exists, in large districts. See 
Ardussi and Ura (2000) for 1746 count of spatial units of administration. 
22 At this stage, we must define community for the sake of clarity of discussion. Following Summers 
(1986), community can be defined as an interactional field. A community is essentially based on systematic 
interconnections between its parts. The fact that the members of a community live within proximal physical 
environment leads them to shared understanding of their predicaments and collective action by either the whole 
community or by parts of the community. "… unified and single public interest collective actions is not a 
defining characteristic of a community but rather a variable attribute,…” (Summers 1986, 353). Of course, this 
definition suffers from leaving out the community as an ethnical and cultural group. Summers definition of the 
community is more political. 
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dialects. The importance of every other language than their local dialects was deflated at the 
border of the community, and hence the power of concepts and artifacts inherent in other 
language was also  diminished, which implies to a certain degree that the framework of ones 
decision are ones own. 
One may add that in Bhutan there was even a legal dimension to the membership in a 
community because cases were settled by the local notables including gups without referring 
to any national legal procedures or standards, that may or may not have existed (no evidence 
has emerged so far to conclude in favour of their existence). Institutions for local associations, 
cooperation and jural settlements were loosely controlled by local lineage-based authority 
with regional affinal networks, and by people who were respected for their ability to listen to 
others and understand the issues facing the local society. The notion of what is a fair decision 
between the litigants was articulated by barmi (literally middle-person, which can be 
understood functionally as a mediator) and jabmi (literally backer, which can be understood 
functionally as  an advocate). The participation in the civic activities of a community in fact 
provides individuals with local citizenship identities. It would seem that no household, and 
the individuals belonging to a household, could claim membership of a community without 
participation in its civic activities. Notions of legitimacy and illegitimacy of a membership 
revolves around the perception of effective participation by a household. In fact, conflicts in a 
community are often matters of free rider households who evade the obligations for civic 
activities while trying to maintain a trustworthy public image of being part and belonging to 
the community.  
The most vivid form of pluralism was the diversification of religious orders that speaks 
clearly about the pluralism of Bhutan in a country that professed certain Buddhist religious 
order as state religion. However, one must be cautious about interpreting what we today call 
state religion meant in the past, when the state did not have a centralised body of clerics and 
its Council as it does today, and when there was no means of effecting mass communications 
of any dominant religious order’s institutional perspective.  
Buddhist teachings were institutionalized on a permanent organizational basis, or it was 
organized flexibly around a noted figure attracting grand-disciples and disciples on an ad hoc 
basis for specific practices. Both forms of knowledge transmission complemented each other 
in the recreation and deepening of Buddhist knowledge and teachings.23 Which curriculum 
mix an initiate exactly studies and ultimately practices depends on the particular school of 
Buddhism subscribed to by his institution. More often than not, a practitioner will become 
syncretic in course of receiving teachings and practices from different religious personages of 
different schools of Buddhism. In fact, versatile relevance of a practitioner is often connected 
to his knowledge and techniques to perform rituals of different schools or traditions of 
Buddhism for different clients. For most Bhutanese, all lamas and teachings, no matter what 
school they belong, are the same. This open attitude could have been shaped by the variety of 
traditions accessible to them. The variegated cultural and religious heritage of Bhutan indeed 
encompassed, and encompasses, the enriching influences of numerous supreme masters of 
different schools of Buddhism. Bhutan has been a place where Sakya, Bon, Dzogchen, Peling, 
Dorling, Neynyingpa, Lhapa, Drigung, Shingtawa, Katerpa, and Kardrupa, Gaylugpa, 
Chagzampa and so forth left their marks (Tenzin Choegyel, 10th Je Khenpo cited in Mynak 
Trulku 1997).24 As always, cross cultural exchanges and interactions between Bhutan and 
                                                 
23 For dynamics of traditional knowledge diffusion based on two different systems of transmission, see 
Fredrik Barth (1990).   
24 There is evidence that some schools of Buddhism were discouraged at the time of founding of the state. 
For example, the heads of five schools of Buddhism were defeated. Whether the defeat extended beyond 
reduction of their political influences to curtailment of religious freedoms are still not clear. However, the 
existence of establishments of various schools of Buddhism to this day would suggest that multiple schools of 
Buddhism continued. For example, Ardussi (1999) cites the expulsion of Choje Barawa in 1634. Yet his 
establishment such as Paro Dranggye Gompa was revived. 
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Tibet has led to such celebrated diversity and richness. And such positive interactions were 
part of value pluralism which must continue even more than through the future.    
Beyond the communities, the members of a gewog had certain rights and obligations 
defined within the context of a gewog in cultural and economic spheres. The members of  
neighbouring gewogs could not get rights to valuable common property resources found 
within the territory of a gewog. Access to those resources beyond ones gewog could be had 
either with sanction from higher powers or authorities, or with customary rights. Like the city 
polity in medieval Europe where the concept of citizenship historically originated (Sassen 
2002), a gewog was the main identifiable polity in Bhutan, where there was a clear customary 
relationship between the individual, polity and resources. This seems to have arisen also 
because the gewogs were political entities as principalities on their own before Bhutan was 
unified in the first half of the 17th century, as a country. In that sense, one could say that the 
community as organisations existed prior to Bhutan as a state, and the workings of a 
community has essentially continued till modern times. In traditional polity in Bhutan, 
individuals developed in a community 25 . There was no external-intervention for the 
development of a community, which is now one of the main goals of decentralization in the 
development era.   
The existence of community is crucially important for the development of an individual 
as a relational entity. It is only within an appropriate scale of community that an individual 
can contribute to and from others, just as members of different species do in an ecological 
system (Hershock forcoming book. Ch. 5). Any institutional structure that diverts its members 
away from interdependence could damage the community, perhaps leading to atomistic 
existence.  Decentralization as diversity can affirm the integrity of communities and 
interdependence of all individuals and things within a community. At the same time, persons 
developing in a community, particularly Buddhist, will not see herself or himself as an 
autonomous self in the standard liberal sense. Rather, as Mancall (2004) says, we can 
“recognise the self as a created object,” as identity constituted by a more or less common 
psychology of a community at one level and as lacking inherent self at another level. Instead 
of developing the community from an external interventionist point of view, an ideal 
community creates conditions for  growth of developed compassionate human beings, who 
are capable of seeing everything as interdependent and as lacking essential identity in 
themselves, and thus able to relate fully to others. 
III. INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT AND EARLY INITIATIVES IN BHUTAN 
Tocqueville, writing in 1830s,  favoured decentralization over “the constitutional non-
centralisation of American federalism” (Kincaid 1999)  because what he called ‘local liberty’ 
based on local communal institutions could be better preserved through decentralization. He 
pointed out  that even modern democratic nations could gravitate towards centralisation, 
atomize individuals, and threaten local liberty, especially in the drive towards equality and 
mass society. Although certain social and political realities have changed since Tocqueville’s 
times, the main thrust of his concern is still relevant.  
Beginning with the use of decentralization as an instrument of prolonging colonial rule 
(Samoff 1990), decentralization is often recommended institutional strategy for developing 
countries, although its contents and forms differ both in time and place. There are countries 
where decentralization has been used not for delegating decision-making, but exactly for the 
                                                 
25 Summers (1986) cites the concept of development of the community as stated by Wilkinson (972, 1979, 
1986) in contrast to the concept of development in the community. But meanings I attach to the development in 
and of the community here are not the same as those given by Summer.  
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opposite purpose – depoliticization of the population and deflection of popular pressure 
towards the local institutional level.26  
Often missing in the literature of decentralization is the experience of local 
representative institutions in communist states, where, ideologically, participation of the 
people (working class) in the administration of a socialist country is imperative. Daniel 
Nelson (1979), studying the local-centre relationships among the communist regimes in 
Russia and Eastern Europe when they were still in power, wrote that "As it stands, there are 
no communist regimes which fail to speak the language of local autonomy, local initiatives, 
and local development. The demand of Marxist-Leninist ideology for a link to the people as 
well as several practical requirements of ruling a nation-state, communist leaders continue to 
place a great deal of time and effort in fostering the image of local authority while cultivating 
the utility of sub-national institutions for centre power."27 Yogoslavia under Tito permitted 
substantial local administrative autonomy. Nelson’s broad conclusion, however, is that the 
communist states used the local organisations primarily for three purposes. Firstly, the local 
political institutions were used for communication functions, ie., to suffuse them with 
messages of what were expected of them by the political cadres. This was  particularly 
necessary within the context of a weak communication infrastructure. Secondly, the local 
political institutions were used for socialisation functions, to disseminate new values and 
create the so called ‘new socialist man’ or ‘socialist consciousness’. Thirdly, Nelson mentions 
that the local political institutions were generally used as a recruiting and training grounds for 
party members. The local organisations where they learnt how to execute a central decision 
locally and to carry out window dressing in self defence while reporting their not-so-
successful implementation. The local organisations became a stepping stone for the local 
leaders to advance to national organisations although they were also exceptions to the 
movement from local to centre.  
If the mixture of centralised planning and bottom up participation have been found to be 
challenging in the former communist countries, the enthusiastic diffusion of wider 
participatory  development approaches, not least by the donors, has produced mixed successes. 
Decentralization and participatory approach to development have been subject of many recent 
studies (Brett 2003, Blair 2000, Tordoff 1994, Willis et al 1999). Although they affirm 
participation as important, Brett in particular has given plausible reasons for sobering results 
that have surfaced in the evaluation of decentralization in several countries carried out by 
others. He believes participatory approaches works for small scale projects but cautions that 
“those who claim that these participatory methodologies can fundamentally alter the nature of 
the power structures that sustain complex societies are simply ignoring the well-established 
insights of modern social science” (Brett 2000).  
Writing from an American perspective in 1945, Selznick elaborated decentralization as 
operative at three levels, which are repeated in guises in current approaches. Selznick’s first 
level reqires the administrative control to be based or located in the area of operation or 
within reasonable physical distance of the implementation area. This will decongest the far 
removed centre where there are often relatively more administrative, technical and financial 
resources in comparison to local operation areas.  
The administrative structure of Bhutan still display increasing accretion of trained 
manpower and office automation resources in the capital city compared to the administrative 
centres in districts. In 2003, over 50% of the total civil service strength was based in Thimphu 
                                                 
26  There are many cases of where decentralization was intended to achieve centralisation. Samoff 
mentions South Africa under apartheid system. He also mentions some local governments in the United States 
which acted against the disadvantaged groups who sought the rule of the centre to break such discrimination of 
minorities to get access to public schools. 
27 Nelson tells us, quoting several communist leaders their own words, that the vocabulary and ethos of 
mass participation were clearly present way back. For example, Lenin said that he "could not imagine democracy, 
even proletariat democracy”...” without  representative institutions,” (Lenin 1968 cited by Nelson). 
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in addition to control the centre had on most of the field posts with respect to the transfers and 
promotion of those field staff. Selznick’s second level requires “the execution of operations 
with and through already organised institutions in the area of operation.” The third level 
requires the participation of local people. Writing in 1960s from perspective allied with 
Tenessee Valley Authority, James Fesler (1965) defined the concept of decentralization as the 
“transfer of power from a central government to an areally or functionally specialised 
authority of distinct legal personality.” He distinguished two decentralization concepts: (1) the 
transfer of authority between levels of administration, ie., from a central government to lower 
levels of administration, and (2) the transfer of authority from a central government to sub-
national democratic governments.   
Blair (2000) present a causal relationship linking participation, through a chain of 
possible achievements, to participation. The causal linkages he drew moves from participation 
=> representation => empowerment => benefits for all => poverty alleviation. In this causal 
relationship for decentralization, participation is not an end in itself as an egalitarian or 
democratic practice. Decentralization and participation are equally desired for increasing 
economic growth and reducing poverty. The hypothesized linkage between decentralization 
and the local poverty alleviation is a micro-version of the linkage between democracy and 
economic growth. This casual relationship is a debated issue.28  
Decentralization, which would lead to formation of democratic local governance, was 
promoted as a key objective of development assistance in the 1990s. The USAID supported 
60 local government activities and the UNDP 250 such initiatives around the world (Blair 
2000). Participatory development was endorsed by the OECD in 1997. In its new incarnation, 
decentralization is political, whereas the older concept of decentralization advocated since the 
1950s was more oriented towards decentralization of public administration. The old version of 
decentralization was administrative and technocratic, and therefore, limitations on its success 
was inherent in the concept itself (Samoff 79, 53). The new incarnation of decentralization 
also involves structural requirements such as formation of sub-national local government 
institutions. It is argued that if democracy has to deepen as close to the communities as 
possible, institutional arrangements must exist at the local level.29  
The decentralization initiatives taken in Bhutan in 1980s effectively precedes 
decentralization efforts in most developing countries, which proliferated in the 1990s, 
although some African Nations like Tanzania and Kenya started decentralization in 1972 
(Picard 1980; Chege Michael & Barkan Joel D. 1989). Exceptions are India’s Phachayati Raj 
programme that began in 1959 (Narain 196530, Berett 2003). One of the reasons for the early 
decentralization in Bhutan was that the country had been traditionally run along decentralized 
lines with a great deal of self-help initiatives by local associations carried out within the local 
environment of gewogs and villages. Bhutan had never been centralised to the degree most 
developing countries under their colonial experiences that favoured the emergence of a 
professionalized bureaucracies which contributed to centralization of decision-making. 
As I have explained elsewhere in detail (Ura 1995), there was major political 
restructuring during the Third King’s reign with many new laws that had the effect of 
increasing political participation on the one hand and centralisation to strengthen the state on 
                                                 
28 Similar dual purposes of decentralization were promoted in Africa. For example, see Samoff Joel. (Jan., 
1979). 
29 This also follows from the Schumpeterian definition of democracy as "that institutional arrangement for 
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquired the power to decide by means of a competitive 
struggle for the people’s votes." (Schumpeter 1950, 250 cited in Lipset 1994, 1). Schumpeter also viewed 
"modern democracy as a product of the capitalist process."  
30 Narain Iqbal has interpreted Jaya Prakash Narayan concept of the Pachayati Raj that came down from 
Gandhi through Vinobhavi as an alternative form of political system to parliamentary system. He contrasts this  
concept with that of democratic decentralization in India as formulated by the Balvantray Mehta team which said 
that "Pachayati Raj institutions should primarily serve as a development mechanism rather than as power 
mechanism." See Narain Iqbal 1965.  
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the other. The Third King became the true giver of the first comprehensive set of laws for 
Bhutan, contrary to statements that Bhutanese laws issue from the period of first Zhabdrung.31 
There is also little truth in statements that the latest legislation, sponsored by various 
ministries, reflect Bhutanese traditions instead of Western Anglo-Saxon laws which began 
setting foot rather firmly after the Company Act of the Kingdom of Bhutan was passed. s 
mentioned earlier, until the Third King’s reign, customary law and legal pluralism that 
reflected local traditions were applied to most crimes and disputes.  
There was a dramatic shift in the local-centre relationship towards the end of the Second 
King’s reign when he decided to restructure the in-kind taxation and flatten administrative 
hierarchies each of which had absorbed revenues to maintain. Real changes came towards the 
early 1960s when the Third King decided to change the traditional political structure to enable 
political participation through the establishment of the National Assembly and Royal 
Advisory Council. He also began fashioning concepts of citizenship based on national laws 
and certain legal and political rights that attend new nationalism. A new concept of the state 
as an owner of national property especially any land not specifically registered privately, 
began to emerge. As Kenneth Waltz (1999, 697) wrote, “in the state of nature, as Kant put it, 
there is no “mine and thine.” States turn  possession into  property and thus make savings, 
production, and prosperity possible.” Through the provisions of Thrimzhung Chenmo, state 
ownership was extended legally to natural resources such as forests and grazing land, laying 
the foundation for their public ownership, and control by the state that profoundly altered 
property relationships. This replaced local community stewardship and ownership of such 
resources as a set of relationship rather than property that was prevalent until that period. 
Until then, it would seem that no such legal concept of state-private ownership was clearly 
articulated, but only a communal vs private land. Further, he enacted, through Thrimzhung 
Chenmo, concrete ceilings on land owned by each household expressing the hitherto 
theoretical notions of equality. The conceptual origin of the land law  and its ceiling were 
squarely in non-capitalist mode of economy at that time when land assumed a central role in 
means of production. The monastic cultivatable land endowments were privatised, thus 
relieving tenants working on it as well as release land for other holders to obtain new lands. 
Some of the aristocratic lands were decommissioned with the same effect, of reducing 
obligatory labour servives by the peasantry. By late 1982, a new land law was enacted, in 
which the exclusion of orchard and urban land categories from land ceiling pre-figured 
commercial thinking, encouraging commercial farmers and farming quite a lot of who happen 
to be civil servants,  in the body of land law which is otherwise rooted in an egalitarian 
subsistence agrarian mode. The Third King also began to craft, introduce and enact laws 
governing social and family relationships that were until that time completely matters of 
ethics32  and social institutions. Historically, land property ownership had been officially 
recognized historically by the state through land register but how it was transferred as 
patrimony was upto local tradition. So transfer through inheritance and marriages were until 
then objectified only as social institutions, and they were not incorporated into legal concepts 
until the reign of Third King. Inheritance and marriage customs were elaborated into detailed 
law in the early reign of the Fourth King.  
From this description, it will be gathered that since the 1960s the old polity and 
economy have been increasingly transformed, whereby communities came to be regulated. 
They also became net recipients of resources from the state instead of being net payers to the 
state, whose material capacity was increased by international flow of assistance. It is an 
unavoidable consequence of resource transfer that the giver (centre) conditions the form and 
the content of its usage, which even successful decentralization cannot eradicate completely. 
                                                 
31 In fact, we have so far no evidence, textual or otherwise of laws other than monastic rules, of civil or 
criminal laws surviving from Zhabdrung’s times. There is only 1729 legal code. John Ardussi (2000) has delved 
into this issue a little bit in his article. 
32 Ethics can be defined in Foucauldian terms as negotiating one’s relationship with morality. 
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At the same time, the Bhutanese state became a net recipient of capital in terms of 
international aid and foreign loans. Its use of such externally derived resources to some degree 
is circumsbribed by regional and global strategic priorities. Such constraints are expressed 
through exacting assistance portofolios of the donors. In consequence, the irony is that 
participatory content of development programmes funded by aid can get narrowed right at the 
beginning as programmes have to fit with the donor pre-determined aid portfolios and budget 
lines and limits that are set in far away parliamentary committees of the donor countries. 
Fundamental seed of change in local-centre relationship came about only with the 
accession of the present His Majesty the King. The institutional changes in numerous spheres 
initiated by His Majesty the King will be an inexhaustible subject on its own and it cannot be 
addressed here. I have to necessarily spotlight only decentralization initiatives.  In 1981, His 
Majesty the King installed DYTs as development forum at the district level. The southern 
district of Samtsi was one of the first districts to do so, which in itself is an interesting 
phenonmena. As far as decentralization was concerned, it seems that the 1980s were devoted 
to structural replication of DYTs throughout the country and to engineer the formulation and 
publication of district development plans over two five year plans, as an instrument of local 
decision-making and distinguishing the local plans from the national sectoral plans to reflect 
this new self-difinition of a district. Spending powers were decentralised to the district 
administrative chiefs in the early 1980s. This power was withdrawn after several district 
chiefs were censured severely for misappropriations by the Royal Audit Authority. 33  
Decentralising financial powers has become more guarded after this experience. Substantial 
change in the pattern of financial authority between the district based field staff and the 
central organisations did not occur after that for a long interval of time.  
For a few years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a new entity called zonal 
administrations were in operation. In the vertical heirarchy between the centre and the 
districts, zonal administrations lay in the middle. Four such area specific bodies were 
established to coordinate administration and development of the country by grouping the 
districts into four quarters. High level officials designated as zonal administrators were 
appointed along with a nucleus of officials supporting these high profile appointments. The 
zonal administrations folded up in early 1990s. My own opinion on this decision are two-fold. 
The first reason is that the start of the unrest in Southern Bhutan made exploration of the new 
structures impossible, as events were to prove later. The second reason, however, is much 
more fundamental. There was no clear advantage of devolving control of districts to zonal 
administrations. It would only lead to centralisation in one node in the middle. The primary 
reason is that the blueprint of zonal administration did not conceive counter weight in terms of 
popular participation at the zonal level, and therefore zonal administrations could potentially 
spin out of control. In brief, there could not have been logical entities such as zonal yargay 
tshogdu (zone development committee). 
 In His Majesty’s reform initiatives, DYTs continued, to be the centrepiece of political 
restructuring. DYTs were to play the central role in the making of development plan for a 
district while the bureaucracy was to implement the decision fundamentally made by the local 
people. The civil servants role was to gather ideas from the people as the basis of 
development programmes. He stressed on production of a district plan in close association 
with the local population and to make district the unit of planning. However, various supra-
district programmes (region specific, circle specific, zones speficic, watershed specific, theme 
specific) were routinely formulated with project managers and budget retained at the centre, 
which made integration and assimilation of such projects into district level plan very difficult. 
The process of supporting the production of genuine area based dzongkhag plans proved only 
partially successful also due to sectoral headquarters’ inadequate attention to moving civil 
servants from their respective headquarters to the districts to create the man power base at the 
                                                 
33 The amounts involved were not huge by today’s scale of resources which are some of the subjects of 
audit objections in Bhutan. 
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periphery. Successive organisational attempts at the large scale infusion of staff into the 
district administrations by creating more positions as well as filling existing positions met 
with relatively little success given the gravitation within the bureaucracy to remain at the 
centre because of incentives structures.  
Thus, the vision of His Majesty remained the only impetus in restructuring the polity. 
By 1991, His Majesty added another lower layer institutional configuration, GYTs, to 
facilitate access to decision-making process by and among the rural communities. The scale 
of operational unit for planning and management of development was smaller and closer to 
the communities. He wanted a more localised channel and platform for the manifestation of 
interests of small scale communities constituing gewogs, without losing their individualities in 
the wider aggregation process of district plans which in turn was amalgamated into national 
sectoral plans. Aggregation into larger system blurs finer information as well as control over 
the plans. Viewed from the perspective of gewogs, a district is too large a unit for 
comprehending their place and their allocations, let alone a national sectoral plan. For the 
people to comprehend and execute plans as their own, break down of development activities 
and their budgetary provisions needed to be projected at the gewog level, which is the lowest 
heirarchy of territorially divided administrative unit. Above all, a GYT which is the 
coordinating and implementing unit for the plan, such a document could serve a functional 
reference point in the ongoing annual revisions. Therefore, in 1998,  His Majesty the King 
announced that 201 gewogs should contemplate making their own five year development 
plans. It would seem from the sequence of these actions that, regardless of the bureaucracy’s 
success rate at implementing his vision, His Majesty the King wanted increasingly to propel 
the country towards a high degree of localisation. In accordance with a directive of His 
Majesty the King, old acts for GYTs and DYTs were amended in 2002 to enlarge the scope of 
their authorities as well as to introduce adult franchise for the election of gups, the chief 
executive of GYTs, for the first time. In the same year gewog-based five-year plans were 
launched along with devolution of some degree of fiscal powers.  Until the DYT and GYT 
chatrim came into force in 2002, budget disbursement power was invested in the district 
administration, and therefore the decision-making was formally centered in the bureaucracy's 
hand. From all the initiatives launched by His Majesty, it can be concluded that his vision is 
to remake gewogs as key sites for social, economic, and cultural decision-making in future, 
and to make mechanisms and processes to restrain central sectors from all encompassing 
standardizations and normalisation, where inappropriate, by the state which would hollow out 
the meaning of decentralization. Development goals as normative: implies imagination of 
what a community ought to be or might be by themselves, and that means giving community 
choice for determining the nature of development as collectivities, without over riding 
standardization.  
Could we then surmise that decentralization in Bhutan as a route to an adapted version 
of communitarianism which has many common elements with liberalism but which does not 
overlap completely with liberalism. In particular, communitarianism and liberalism are not 
opposed to each other in terms of individual rights, even though on the surface liberalism’s 
bias towards individualistic rights may seem to be in tension with communitarianism’s 
emphasis on collective interests and rights ascribed to a group or community.34 Individual 
rights help members of a community to seek and protect their collective rights if they achieve 
collective action among themselves. The main controvery between liberalist thesis and 
communitarianism is perceived to be the incentive structure of a liberal society that makes the 
individuals as autonomous choosers of ends less likely to maintain commitment and bonding 
to community. In other words, communities cannot be preserved while individuals living in 
                                                 
34 For a defence of the liberal political thesis as compatible with communitarinism See Buchanan (1982). 
He mentions that Rawl’s justification for priority of liberal rights is not “biased toward individualism and against 
community”… because “the contract method assumes only pluralism, not individualism.” And one can assume 
parties in the original position either as individuals or communities (pp. 864). 
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competitive market competition cannot maintain structures of a community. Like his previous 
argument in defence of individual rights as a ‘good’ for communitarianism, Buchanan’s 
(1982) defence of individuals as autonomous chooser of ends is also based on his argument 
that voluntary choice is crucial to maintain a community and that unreflective commitments 
and obligations to the community by its members can endanger the autonomy of the 
individual. Thus the crucial question turns on autonomy and self as a bed rock issue, which 
will be dealt in the next section. At the end, Buchanan, following Feinberg, shows that 
individual autonomy in the framework of liberal rights is not the only value. Individual 
autonomy conferred by rights are valuable because it is necessary for pursuing well-being, 
and “well-being is to a large extent a matter of the successful pursuit of shared ends.” As he 
recognises, it is not in the theoretical realms of liberalism vs communitarianism that problems 
lie. Buchanan (p.881) says that when we try to decide on the scope of rights in concrete cases, 
“the autonomy-based and a community-based arguments may diverge, leading to different 
and, indeed, incompatible specifications of the rights in question.” 
As it was argued at the end of the previous section on historical perspective on local-
centre relationship, neither autonomy-based nor community-based arguments are fully 
compatible with the idea of a community I referred to. This is because the different 
conceptual underpinnings provided by Buddhist culture which views autonomy as not a given. 
Like all concepts, from a Buddhist point of view self is only a construct. Furthermore, it bears 
repeating that from a Buddhist point of view,  liberalism, communitarianism, or any other 
political structure for that matter, are of only instrumental value and have no instrinic value 
and truth in themselves. That is to say that they are all entirely conventions which are 
historically contingent (Herschock 2004, Mancall 2004). Justification for any convention lie 
only in the extent they facilitate the creation of a developed human being.  
IV. EMPOWERMENT AND AUTONOMY 
Participation, representation and empowerment are central to political liberalism and 
these three concept needs to be discussed, not only as contested concepts but as they may or 
may not apply in the case of decentralization process in Bhutan. I should therefore discuss 
them by turn, beginning here with the interrelated concepts of empowerment and autonomy. 
Decentralization is often referred to also as a process towards democratic local government 
(Blair 2003). Encapulating all of these concepts is autonomy or freedom of individual 
according to liberal view (Bevir 1999). The liberal humanist view of freedom and autonomy 
rest on the device of human rights that protect individuals from social constraints and 
domination. Immediately, one can see that the liberal view of autonomy requires a conception 
of oneself (subject) and others (object), the unambiguous division of life into public and 
private spheres, and conceptions of rights attached to the subject. Extending liberal view, we 
can argue that  decentralization is a method of demarcating and balancing power accretions 
between the centre and the local, and dispersing power from the centre to the local, with the 
primary objective of enlarging the autonomy and freedom of individuals.  
However, viewed from the perspective of autonomy of individuals, the emphasis on the 
use of the main current indicators of decentralization pertaining to fiscal decentralization, 
popular participation in terms of election to representational institutions, delegation of powers 
to local administrations and so forth are imperfect instruments for cross-national comparisons. 
This is so because  there is no necessary relationship between the levels of these indicators 
with degrees of individual autonomy and freedom. This does not mean a denial of the 
importance of these indicators for specific purposes such as fiscal indicators for fiscal 
decentralization, and elections for representational reforms, but only that the same level of 
indicators in different places do not necessarily entail the same level of autonomy and 
freedom. Same administrative and fiscal configurations across space can reveal very different 
levels of freedom and autonomy.  
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However, the liberal view of autonomy and knowledge has been criticised from several 
standpoints, such as holism, post-modernism and communitarianism, and most notably by 
Foucault (Bevir 1999, Rorty 1983). The basic thrust of Foucault’s criticism against liberal 
view of autonomy is that a subject cannot stand outside society: he is necessarily part of it and 
all his reasoning and knowledge embody that context. Thus, a subject is not free of power 
relations which is pervasive in any society, and therefore no subject can be autonomous. 
Likewise, post-structuralist argue that any knowledge claimed to be universal and objective as 
done by liberalism cannot be so; it is locally rooted; and all knowledge systems are context 
based and are considered to be interpretations35. The view that there may not fundamentally 
be a larger system of knowledge that compares and evaluates between and among different 
knowledges is also very important in the context of divergence between peasantry’ knowledge 
and bureaucrats’ knowledge in Bhutan. Technical approaches and criteria derived from 
bureaucracy’s knowledge, and applied by bureaucracy in development programme 
management, often implicitly assumes a sense of superiority and attempts to subsume 
peasant’s local knowledge. Bureaucracy’s knowledge implicitly often assumes its own higher 
validity as a method in search for societal progress, and as a solution to society problems. 
Hence, this thinking leaves open the local initiatives based on local knowledge to be displaced 
when there are implicit contestations to development goals and methods.   
We need not, however, reject empowerment through decentralization because autonomy 
is shown to be implausible. We owe to Bevir’s work for drawing the distinction between the 
implausibility of autonomous subject 36  and defence of autonomous agency in Foucault 
postulates about power and knowledge and autonomy 37 . Even if autonomous subject is 
impossible, the subject as an agent can resist others’ dominance in determining the course of 
action he should take. Power and influence, as opposed to violence, implicates or presupposes 
the capacity of the subject to act freely (Bevir 1999, 73).38 In decentralization arena, agency 
as freedom becomes the basis of defining a set of locally preferred programmes; to modify 
and adopt national plans and policies and laws as applied to local situations. 
To Foucauldian criticism of the subject as autonomous may also be added Buddhist 
criticism of subject as an autonomous being. It is relevant to mention Buddhism in passing 
here, as Buddhist ethics should define at least some aspects of polity and economy of Bhutan, 
and hence decentralization, in Bhutan. According to the well-known Buddhist perspective, 
                                                 
35 Warren Mark (1990:626) has pointed out that even if knowledge is interpretation, different ‘local’ 
“interpretations have different impacts on individuals’ capacities for autonomy.” He has also critized 
poststructuralist and rational choice theorists equally. He says: “rational choice theorists are insensitive to 
domination, post-structuralist totalize domination by failing to show how any form of consciousness could 
contribute to political self-determination.”  
36 According to Warren Mark (1990:603), Althusser showed that ideology shapes what the individuals 
understand themselve to be ie. their self-identity or subjectivity. The main effect of an ideology is supposed to be 
on how an individual defines himself or herself to be. If ideology constructs identity of a person and the person’s 
knowledge of his own identity is the same as that of the ideology’s construct of the identity, individuals are 
reduced to social structures. There is then no autonomous agents.  Warren takes rational choice Marxism to be 
opposite of Althusserian hypothesis. In rational choice Marxism, social structures are explicable in terms of 
effects of individuals’ maximising decision.  He says that the role of political theory that seeks to guide action 
would be meaningless if there is no autonomous agents. He then improves on the explanatory power of the 
concept of rational autonomy.   
37 Warren (1990:626) defines autonomy as capacities for self-determination, but I could not get what self-
determination is in a political sense, at least in the article. He remarks that autonomy is fostered by social process 
in broad terms. There are social processes through which autonomy is developed and others which blocks 
autonomy. He uses significance of ideology to explain how certain forms of consciousness undermines rational 
autonomy.   
38 Foucault defined agency and freedom as developing ethics. He further referred to ethics as negotiated 
relationship with a set of rules, not rules themselves. Ethical conduct is a practice questioning (social  rules  
which includes moral rules) by interpreting creatively to resisting normalizing pressures of state power. Bevir 
(1999, 79) points out the danger that valuing good transgressions can provide ground to build ethics, while 
transgressions in and of itself cannot. Transgression expresses a capacity for agency.   
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there is no discrete consciousness that allows for such autonomy of an individual. Our 
consciousness is inter-subjective, when percieved through the lenses of interdependent 
origination and impermanence. There is no Cartesian self as posited in liberalism (Priest 
1981).39   But this no self concept40 is not to reject the value of improving conditions of 
mundane life, for we exist with our pains at an empirical and conventional level, and its 
ameliorations becomes the basis of merit-accummulation and practice of impartiality as 
compasion. For a Buddhist perspective, decentralization can be evaluated as to whether it 
shapes people collectively away from self-centredness and towards understanding and 
practice of compassion, and shared karmic notions of justice and cultivation of wisdom 
mind.41 In emphasing development and decentralization as conducive to material well-being, 
the strategy followed by most upwardly mobile Buddhists in Bhutan is to first get rich so that 
they obtain sufficient resources to buy merit by sponsoring rituals, renders Buddhists into a 
kind of commodity transactions in which those with material endowments will continue to 
dominate merit making. Yet it is clear from this that there is tension between merit making 
and equality.42  
Liberal democracy literature highlights the empowerment of civil society. Though they 
disagree on the nature of action for social and political change, both Habermas and Foucault, 
two influential thinkers, agree on defence of civil society. Civil society is usually considered 
positioned outside the state, in effect against or distinct from the state. But it actually seems 
that the location of civil society is not pre-determined; it redefines or defends the boundaries 
between itself and the state (Keane 1988 quoted by Flyvbjerg 1998, 211). A confusing variety 
of definitions and functions of civil society complicate discussion on this issue. Keane has 
alerted us to the bias in the concept of civil society itself: the concepts of inequality, exclusion 
and domination are inherent in the concept of civil society. So if one were to examine a 
relatively domination free society with this artefact of scholarship, the method would not 
guarantee any ‘objective’ result. It is often boldly noted in external consultancy reports that 
Bhutan lacks associations and civil society. In contrast, local reports and views affirm the 
abundance of networks and associations, clearly leaving a gulf to be crossed to come to a 
common view.43 Perhaps, it is the difference in definitions of civil society used by each side. 
                                                 
39 Priest distinguishes the thinker (self) and thought in Cartesian case. He also distinguishes being 
conscious of an experience as consciousness from self-consciousness which is conciousness of being conscious 
(rang rig in Tibetan vocabulary). In any case, the existence of self, which can exist in an subjective world alone 
is implicated in Cartesian case. One should add, however, that the Cartesian self-awareness is consciousness of 
consciousness of first-person reference in a subjective world. This contrasts with Fregean and  Wittgensteinian 
conception of self that says that that any first-person reference is a special mode of identification in which there 
is no distinction between subject and object. Christofidou (1995) explained this: “in first person reference, the 
object of an ‘I’-thought is identical with its subject.”  
40 The eminent Tibetan scholar Samten Karmay questions the spread of the doctrine of no self in the 
Tibetan cultural world. This doctrine, according to him, did not fully displace the nativist concept of ‘srog’ and 
left analytical thinking between no-self and srog in tension.  I do not know where I read it and cannot give 
reference. 
41  In concrete terms, it depends on whether decentralization can lead progressively to both leisure 
(releasing time from 18 types of preoccupations = mi ‘khom pa bco brgyad) and wealth (‘byor ba) while also  
enhancing the practise not only of passive 10 non-virtues (Mi dge ba bcu). Ten non-virtues to be renounced are: 
(1)  not to take life. (2) not to take what is not willingly given. (3) not to engage in improper sexual practices. (4) 
not to communicate falsehood. (5) not to use violent language. (6) not to slander and malign. (7) not to talk 
irrelevantly. (8)  not to feel covetous. (9) not to contemplate malice and harm. (10) not to hold ‘logpar tawa’ 
beliefs. The virtues are almost reverse of these practices but there are important exceptions. Some of them 
consist of an activist ethics of 10 virtues (dge ba bcu). Ten virtues are  (1) to save life, (2) to be generous, (3) to 
maintain conjugal commitment (4) to tell truth (5) to promote peace and reconciliation, (6) to communicate in 
gentle non-offensive manner (7) to speak only  for significant and meaningful reason, (8) to practise loving 
kindness, (9) to practise compassion, (10) to practise dharma. For a succinct contrast of 10 virtues and non-
virtues, See Karma Chagme’s evocative bde ba can gyi smon lam.) 
42 See Karma Ura, forthcoming article on Buddhism in Bhutan. 
43 Tashi Choden and Lham Dorji, reseachers of the Centre for Bhutan Studies, have begun collecting 
profiles on associations existing in both rural and urban Bhutan. 
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External consultants or researchers, whose view of finding civil society in Bhutan embody 
assumptions of legal forms and separate interest of civil society do not concede to the 
different social structure and polity where the capacity and expressions for resistance may 
take very different modes and practices. They have also hardly had access to the operation of 
community dynamics or to historical evidences about politics of counter movements to test 
their view of society and civil society. The mere absence of legally registered bodies devoted 
to opposition to the state has perhaps led them to an image of a society subordinated 
completely and monolithically to a totalising power of the state. 
In practical terms, true empowerment for effective agency cannot occur without 
devolving certain amout of regulatory powers and the financial authority. Both on economic 
and legal bases, for exercising local authorities and institutions are necessary for substantive 
empowerment. Where decentralization has often not succeeded as much as it should in other 
countries may have to do with over emphasis on empowerment in a participatory planning 
and management of the development programmes that still has to adhere to regulations and 
laws passed at the centre and the discourse of local community development are framed by 
universal discourse. Such empowerment, however successful, restricts its application to 
choices within broader uniform central rules, directives and legislation, and cannot give 
sufficient and effective space to local initiatives in the true sense of the term.  To illustrate my 
point with a concrete example, the decentralised administrative powers to GYTs and DYTs 
will enable local people to exercise basically choices over where to do certain things (spatial 
choice) and when to do it (temporal choice) and what should be chosen (prioritisation choice) 
within given options. These three dimensions of choices given by decentralised administrative 
powers can be illustrated for a few sectors. In addition to prioritizing activities, the local 
people can choose where to have a facility like primary school, irrigation channel, feeder 
roads, suspension bridge, or choose where and when to plant a variety of root crop or tree 
crop from a given set of variety advocated by farm extension staff. These are the usual 
contents of administrative powers devolved to the local representative institutions and the 
local population. When one examines these choices, they do not meet the expansive concept 
of decentralized administrative powers, that was for example, proposed by Tocqueville 
(Kincaid 1999), to exercise local initiatives. Genuine initiative consists fundamentally in 
conception, identification and designing stage which implies an act of creation and 
envisioning. In the context of decentralization, true local initiative and liberty lies in  
authoring and origination of an activity rather than its execution. If this initiation stage is 
subsumed by a centralised decision or a nationally uniform design, say for primary school, 
bridge, irrigation channel, adoption of a variety, it effectively preempts the creativity and 
innovation. Thinking locally thus becomes difficult. One can only implement or execute 
locally a centralized national design. The very idea of decentralised polity as an approach to 
fit diversity of various kinds: ecology, natural resources, social beliefs, etc. that leads to 
different learning processes is frustrated. In this respect, the search for replicable experiences 
through decentralization and replication of designs, that is unwittingly a criteria of good 
projects, among decentralised units is a little contrary to the spirit of decentralization. 
Decentralization should encourage social and economic experiments and those successful 
experiments can be the basis for emulation by others. But this is different from replicating 
from above any best way. As an example of successful local approach based on diversity of 
local designs, Bhutan is marked by one of the main symbols of a local community: the 
community temple. Temples of various shapes and design across the country provide 
testimony to the viability of community’s  ability to conceptualise and envision both artistic 
and utilitarian structures. It is not only physical structure but organizational sophistication 
which sustained community life. 
People’s participation in the authoring and origination of activities is indeed the 
centrepiece of empowerment. Whether a decision made reflects empowerment of local 
participants can be studied in greater detail by determining different types of actors 
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participating in various stages of a decision. Broadly, we can envisage three types of 
participants: elected representatives of a community (political participant); individuals and 
groups from the community (community participant); and civil servants (bureaucratic 
participant) (Skok 1974, p. 69). The level of participation in a decision by these three types of 
participants can be assessed as to which type of participants contribute more extensively in a 
decision. Degree of decentralization cannot only be studied for a particular decision, it can 
also be broken down further by the three decisional stages to inquire at which stage who 
participates more.44 Skok divided decision making into three stages: problem identification 
stage, decision structuring stage and decision selection stage. But one could plausibly divide 
decision making simply into designing and conceptualisation stage and implementation stage 
against the background of a perceived need. It is quite likely that the decisions made in rural 
Bhutan for rural infrastructural development or other planned activity have pervasively 
greater bureaucratic participation at the designing and conceptualisation stage. The 
bureaucracy must not only present a proposal, but a set of alternatives which also can be 
overridden by GYTs and DYTs. 
In Bhutan, as in most developing countries, promoting local participation within the 
context of a rising strength of professionalised bureaucracy into which the state injects huge 
amount of its plan budget to train and retrain, asymmetry in the prestige and influence 
between civil servants and the local elites and people present constraints to decentralization. 
Since modernisation started in 1961, there has been a steady growth of bureaucracy organised 
in same international rooster of sectoral ministries with various field posts, and parastatals 
whose decision widely affect the daily lives of the people. The field officers are physically 
located in the districts, but administratively and functionally located in their sectoral 
heirarchical centralisation with much of the responsibility assigned and directed by 
directorates in Thimphu.  
Growth of a professionalised bureaucracy tended to result in a new style of decision-
making that is often internal to the complex Weberian organizations within the civil service, 
based on technocratic criteria derived from their specialized disciplines. The very constructs 
of development and development programme purveyed by the civil servants in new 
vocabularies, which are translations, meant a very difficult dialogue based on imprecise and 
unreliable understanding between the civil service and the peasantry. The civil servants 
approach the people holding prescriptions based on what they construe as universal 
knowledge, while the local peasantry think in terms of solution only to their particularistic 
context and knowledge. Between the people and the professionalised civil servants, the 
asymmetry of knowledges, technical skills, resources including technology of communication 
and mobility, make rational and equal dialogue between the two difficult. In this context, an 
increased interaction between the bureaucracy and DYT and GYTs,  can in fact encourage  
DYTs aqnd GYT to be subjected more and more to wider rules and regulations and authority 
of the bureaucracy, if  the domain of the DYTs and GYTs’ activities continues to be confined 
to development programmes. This also points to the need for GYTs and DYTs to have a 
minimal rules making powers, to provide them with opportunity to practice small policy 
making for their locality in order to learn and apply it to bigger national issues in course of 
time. 
Major decisions on projects and programmes must not only be presented or chosen on 
technical criteria, by which must decisions are made today, but by moral, aesthetic45 and 
social criteria. Excessive emphasis on technical orientation of the discussions is always shown 
to preclude participation of the local people. If technical expertise and technical criteria were 
                                                 
44 Skok’s (1974) comparative study on Montgomery and Prince George communities’ decision-making in 
terms of participation and overlap disproved the notion implicit in the reform style hypothesis that 
professionalized bureaucracies necessarily replaced community participation.  
45 Aesthetic standard here is not meant to apply to technical skills of making somethings. It is to be 
understood more in terms of social aesthetic standards of how to relate to others (Carrithers Michael,  1990). 
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all that were necessary for successful plans, the local participation would be entirely 
redundant. The issue between technical criteria-led decisions is also an issue between the 
local policy-making and implementation. If local policy-making is subsumed by technical 
criteria, all that is left to the local population is implementation.  
The alliance between plans, technical criteria and physical targets and resource 
estimation are the key features of the language of development. It embodies technocratic 
perspective of development. And this is also the main obstacle to participation. How 
decisionmaking can be transferred from those with technical expertise to those without it in a 
world most individuals have no technical knowledge is a challenge of knowledge 
decentralization. It must be emphasized, however, that the peasants by virtue of the 
transmission and accummulation of knowledge about the local ecology and landscape, they 
possess perhaps higher knowledge of this kind compared to outsiders with theoretical 
knowledge. 
Moreover, it is not only the launching and legitimation of the programme by GYTs and 
DYTs that is at stake during deliberations, but the local participation is crucial to the overall 
sustaining of development process. If DYTs and GYTs and the local population do participate 
in designing and conceptualisation stage, GYTs and DYTs can become public arena for 
orientation of their members to  secure approval of plans made by experts on the basis of 
technical criteria alone. At the same time, the divergence between national technical criteria 
led decisions and local decisions may parallel the divergence between peasant’s local 
indigenous knowledge and bureaucracy’s knowledge, criteria and rules and norms, assumed 
to be universally applicable ones.  The issue reflects once more the controversy about the best 
means of intervention for the development of a community: should the decisions on goals and 
methods of intervention be made by planners and technicians or the peasants themselves 
(Summers 1986, 361) as agents of change. But if planners and technicians, as so called 
change agents, are the ultimate interventionists, the agency of locals is displaced, and we are 
back to not only loss of autonomy of subjects but also denial of subject as agent to transform 
his or her condition based on their experiential learning of their every day life.  
Often, the fundamental ground for minimisation or exclusion of laypersons involvement 
in scientific and technical issues is based on their lack of understanding about complex 
decisions. Such decisions usually have technical risk assessment as a major element of 
decision. More is now known that scientists and  experts also use extensively value 
judgements in making decisions about risk management and uncertainty (Frewer and Rowe, 
2000) and that properly communicated, laypersons can participate in evaluating technical and 
scientific policies. In addition, laypersons are often not given access to information on which 
a structured decision can be made by laypersons. A number of procedures and criteria have 
been developed to promote effective participation of the laypersons in science and technology 
policy. These procedures and criteria do not usually measure what constitute better outcomes 
resulting from public participation (Frewer and Rowe 2000, 10). 
In terms of power, decentralization seeks to promote local power vis-a-vis the centre 
power by striking a balance of power in the centre-local relationship. While both the centre 
and the local have to co-exist, the international literature on decentralization is conspicuously 
deficient on the exact balance that is to be struck in financial, technical, regulatory and 
administrative powers between the centre and the local decision-making entities. Within the 
Bhutanese context, power accretion in the GYTs and DYTs means the creation of regulatory 
and administrative powers to enable representative to take the initiatives in context with the 
bureaucracy. District administration are often considered as an object of delegation of power. 
However, taking a long term view its will be misleading to consider it as an institutional 
edifice for decentralization. Rather, district administrations should be considered as evolving 
non-politicized structures effecting the decisions made by the GYTs and DYTs.  
At present, the district administration and the sectoral staff constituting the district 
administration are the field network of the centre. However, as the central directorate holds 
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power over local sectoral staff over their promotion, foreign travel, higher studies and training,  
they walk a tight rope  between four actors: the district chief, the day-to-day head of  the 
district administration; their ‘clients’  embodied in the GYT and DYTs; and sectoral 
headquarter in Thimphu who is their  final and ultimate personnel and technical authority.            
Within the district administration, the district administrator has a primal public relations 
and communications role and the balance he can strike between this role and the complicated 
role of development programme management depends on his skillful maximisation of his 
inputs which he views as having greater pay off for his career. Unlike other positions in the 
civil service, the district chief’s posts due to its extensive roles that defies any neat 
categorisation, paradoxically, provides the greatest range of opportunities for a civil servant to 
negotiate his functions with real latitude of focus. His own career prospect are relatively 
immune from the failure of development plans as he can hedge on the delays and non-
responsiveness of central sectoral directorates and ministries, who have the final say on 
budget estimates and release.  
Decentralization entails ongoing dialogues and communication between the central 
bureaucracy and DYTs and GYTs through district administrations. But the feedback cycle is 
not operational to a desirable degree. There is no direct links between GYTs and DYTs with 
the directorates and sectoral ministries, except in theory, through Home Ministry. As most of 
the discussions and decisions of DYTs pertain not to security and immigration issues, the 
choice of Home Ministry as the primal recipient of such minutes and resolutions ‘for kind 
information and necessary action’ seems puzzling, and is a historical practice that could not 
yet adapt to the changed reality in the administrative system as a whole. Indeed the choice of 
Home Ministry as the institution coordinating decentralization process is less than ideal. 
Relevent sections of deliberations of the DYTs and GYTs which have implication on each 
ministry ought to be sorted by an agency from the general mass of deliberations of GYTs and 
DYTs, and messages and actions requests should be distributed to the relevant decision centres 
in Thimphu, if the intervening layers of decision maker such as district administrator and 
regional officials do not have power to respond quickly or resolve the service request within 
his power and resources. This step will bring to a concerned ministry rich vein of 
communications from around the country regularly, and present a broader popular view of the 
local participatory institutions on sectoral performances that is not depended entirely on their 
field staff. If the DYT and GYT proceedings are regularly scrutinized for feedbacks, there will 
indeed be no need to establish any parallel national monitoring and evaluation system that has 
been the object of every ministry led by the Department of Planning for almost a decade. The 
local staff posted in the districts and gewogs are partly responsible for data collection and 
reporting to the centre on meeting of physical targets of an annual or longer duration of a plan. 
Thus they have a compulsion to drive forward for quantitative fulfilment to meet physical 
targets.  At the moment, there is no institutionalization of feedbacks and no unit to process 
information generated by the GYTs and DYTs even though a substantial part of minutes and 
resolutions of their meetings assume central ministries as their audience. The flow of 
information in this regard has remained a one-way process from bottom to top, but emptying, 
it seems at the moment, into a vaccum.  
 Although DYTs meet and produce volumes of data in terms of proceedings which one 
day researchers will uncode and analyse,  effective participation by elected members in this 
fora are still hampered by lack of access to broader policy documents and prior discussion 
papers, due to the currency of English medium in official policy documents, that would lead 
them to  consider alternatives courses of action, rather than changing elements within a given 
course. The requirement for fruitful and meaningful exchanges can be improved by giving all 
the members equally privileged access to wider information. Due to the higher density of 
information, and perhaps higher quality of information, that is available to the civil servants 
who are observer members in DYTs, the weight of arguments can lie heavily in favour of them, 
in case they intervene. The continued presence of the district chief in the DYT is both a help 
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and a hindrance at the same time, depending on the ability and personality of the incumbent to 
emphathize with non-civil servants who do not belong to the bureaucracy with which district 
chief identifies. 
One of the bureaucracy’s main method of making decisions within itself is multisectoral 
consultation  that allows it to devote untold amount of its expensive time on discussions. In 
principle, such consultative mechanism should bring diverse views to bear on a decision, and 
to co-opt any objections and differences. If meetings are a key method of decision-making 
and sharing views in the bureaucracy, the same latitude to enable numerous meetings in the 
GYTs and DYTs to occur need to be provided. The current level of budget for travel, food and 
stationeries to support a higher frequency of their meetings is limited; these institutions can 
hardly hold the current minimum of four meetings a year with the present level of financial 
provisions. 
The central issue, as pointed our ealier, is the the degree of regulatory powers as distinct 
from  administrative ones given to the local representational institutions like GYTs and DYTs. 
Administrative powers  in the usual sense of the term imply powers to carry out rules, not to 
make rules or regulations or local laws. However as soon as a richer notion of decentralization 
is  conceptualised, as a means to promoting agency, it seems desirable that some degree of the 
rule making or  the regulatory power be broadened to the GYTs and DYTs.  Regulation is 
different from administration in that  “it involves the use of governmental authority  to 
constrain the behaviour of private actors. Unlike distributive,  redistributive, and other 
policies, and  regulation does not involve large amounts of direct governmental 
expenditure…” ( Teske and Gerber 2000, 852).    This means  that delegating  certain degree 
of regulatory power is much more effective than giving a lot of administrative room. It is 
conducive not only for local democratic practices but also accomplishing tasks.   
For analytic purpose, one may categorise regulatory or rule making powers into 
concurrent, pre-emptive and subsidiary powers. Concurrent powers would be those powers 
enjoyed equally by both the centre and the local representational institutions. In fiscal matter, 
the power given to a municipality to obtain loan is also enjoyed by the centre to obtain loan 
for spending in the municipality. This is an instance of concurrent power. Subsidiary powers 
are those given exclusively to local representational institutions. Pre-emptive powers are those 
that the centre may exercise in the jurisdiction of local representational institutions. 
In the current GYT and DYT acts,  some of the more simple regulatory powers46 are 
based on the concept of minimum standards preemption power reserved for the central 
legislation. That is  that the regulations passed by these  local institutions  can exceed  the 
national regulatory framework:  but the minimum standard must be the national standard. 
However,  in many areas in which a locality preceives to be in need of urgent action, there 
may be no national laws to provide the framework for local laws or regulation. The local 
representational institutions have, and should, take their own measures for and on behalf of 
their communities. This has anyway been the experience in Bhutan. The centre has adopted 
regulations throughout the nation after a certain DYT pioneered them. For example, the 
national regulation prohibiting plastic shopping bags had its precursor in Samdrup Jongkhar 
                                                 
46 Regulatory powers of a DYT consist of: esignation, protection of monuments, sites parks, sanctuaries; 
delineation of  boundaries between geogs, towns and municipalities; posting of billboards, road signs, posters, 
banners, & other commercial advertisements; consumer protection against unfair pricing, counterfeit goods; 
commercial sale of alcohol, tobacco, tobacco products; prevention of gambling and control of noise pollution; 
content of cable telecasting; defence and security; prevention of communicable diseases among livestock; 
regulation of prices, & safety standards of dairy & livestock products; establishment of quarries, mines; 
protection of public health.  
Regulatory powers of a GYT consist of: safe waste disposal; control, prevention of pollution (air, water, 
soil); sanitation standards; control of communicable livestock disease; allocating drinking & irrigation water; 
architectural standards within national standards; sustainable harvest of edible forest products; establishing 
handicraft enterprises and setting up co-operatives; preventing depredation of crops by livestock and wildlife; 
creating, designating recreation areas around villages;exemptions of in cash, in kind or labor contributions 
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district, whereby this DYT invented a rule which did not exist at that time nationally. Drinking, 
gambling, and tobacco regulations are some of the other areas where local representational 
institutions passed regulations effective in their jurisdiction long before the centre, either the 
ministries or the National Assembly, considered the issue for the whole country. In the current 
DYT and GYT acts, regulatory powers over many problems of local natures related to 
environment and commons that cannot be resolved easily by the centre are accorded to them.  
Thus, truly local initiatives are permitted, unless explicitly preempted by national laws. The 
problem with this approach is that most national laws drawn up earlier than 2003 presumed a 
completely unitary system. Moreover, laws engineered by various central institution continues 
to be enacted reserving exclusive powers to the centre.         
After empowerment for making decision at the conceptual and designing stage of 
development programmes is secured,  the next most salient issue in empowerment and in 
local administrative autonomy is allocation of resources, ie., where and for what should a 
given resource be spent in the locales if the local institution had the requisite power and 
authority. Although the acts gives them sufficient financial authority 47 , the starting 
problematic is that there is no given budget that can be freely allocated by local political unit, 
just as there is no capital budget at the centre that can be allocated. The capital budget, 
whether at the centre or local level, is notional and its actualization depends on cascading 
flow from external development partners to the national budget and from there in quarterly 
releases to the sectors and dzongkhags. What there is in more concrete terms is an array of 
skeletal proposals of activities scheduled for a specified period of plan – one or five years – 
proposed by the local political units. Such needs are processed through successive levels of 
heirarchy of bureaucracy, and as it goes higher, the similar sounding needs from a number of 
districts are integrated and packed together as a programme or project and given for funding 
to the donors, now wrapped in elaborate vocabularies and technical criteria of development 
projects. Meanwhile the programmes and projects might be considered approved although 
funding has not been secured, whereas ‘approved’ to local ears often has the air of finalized 
appropriation. 
At present, the amount of  spending  channelled through the district administration and  
local representive institutions  is  not substantial. A recent finding48 showed that the central 
government accounted for 82.9% of the total spending in 2002-2003. The  districts  accounted 
for 16.4% and the gewogs for 0.7% of the total spending for 2002-2003, the first year after the 
new GYT and DYT acts were passed. Of course, this pattern of spending will most probably 
change in favour of district administrations and gewogs, but a substantial shift cannot take 
place without government becoming self-reliant in capital expenditure.  
Moreover, a substantial shift in spending from the centre to the local cannot take place 
without abandoning the irresistible practice of devising supra-district programmes (region 
specific, circle specific, zone speficic, watershed specific, theme specific) that lead to 
appointment of project managers at the centre and budget-retention at the centre both of 
which precipitate substantial fringe benefits such as training, travel, office automation, 
transport facilities etc. to the personnel at the centre. The continuation of supra-district 
programmes is often defended on grounds of efficiency. Efficiency argument thus seems a 
factor in centralisation. As this is a major plank in the defence of centralisation used by  
certain quarters of Bhutanese central bureaucracy, one needs to take a closer look at it. 
Operating within liberal political and neo-classical economic framework, Deutsch and 
Kochen (1969) formulated an exploratory functional theory of decentralization which focused 
on cost-effectiveness of responding to the population’s demands for services, both material 
                                                 
47 The DYTs have powers to prioritize resources for the dzongkhags and gewog plan activities; re-
appropriate dzonkhag plan budgets according to financial rules and regulations laid down for the purpose; re-
allocate gewog plan budgets from one gewog to another gewog to finance plan activities. A GYT can retain rural 
taxes for maintenance of certain facilities in a gewog. 
48 See Francoise Vaillancourt (2004. p. 12). 
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and informational, by several decision-making units. In brief,  their model suggested that the 
decision-making units or service centre points can be multiplied until the marginal increase in 
fixed cost equals the marginal decrease in the cost of communication and transportation due 
to decentralization, taking into account costs of delivering services, cost of waiting time for 
those deliveries, and cost of redundancies between multiple service centres. Their paper 
suggested that “optimal degree of decentralization increases with the decrease in the 
proportion of the fixed capital cost of the service among its total costs.” (Deutsch and Kochen 
1969, 748). So, as cost of labour increases relative to capital goods, the number of 
decentralised units should increase. Besides, the load on central agency would increase 
tremendously as peoples needs, that has to be sorted and referred to decision centres, changes 
and grows more complex. Mean response time is taken as an important performance indicator 
of the decision centre or central agency, wherever time is relevant factor of response. The 
longer the response time, the higher the cost of waiting. The cost of waiting can be indexed to 
“the utility of time to the average user.”  
This framework points to three important cost factors that should favour 
decentralization in Bhutan. First, the cost of labour, on its own and relative to capital, has 
shown signs of exceptional overheating in rural areas for a long time. This phenomenon has 
hardly entered policy debate. The except to this tendency is the edict issued by His Majesty 
the King abolising compulsary labour contribution for 15 days by each household, known as 
gungdang woola. Three factors are responsible for this overheating: (a) departure of people 
from rural sector to the modern sector including bureaucracy, military, monasteries, trade, 
education and parastatals and industries; (b) it has to do with absence of foreign immigrant 
labour in rural areas compared to towns or urban areas where, paradoxically, labour wages are 
lower, held down by immigrant labour supply. Immigrant labour permissions are not 
applicable to rural house construction; (c) the wage rate in rural areas for labour contribution 
to benificiary local projects are equalized by law through out the country. But the fact that 
labourers cannot be hired for Nu.100 as substitute workers, when those liable cannot attend to 
it themselves, suggests that actual wage rate has overshot the national official wage level in 
many parts of the country. Second, related to the first point, people value of time is rising. 
Third, the diversity of the country on many dimensions, and hence also the country’s vastness 
despite its area, makes  minute diversified response from the centre too challenging.  As GYTs, 
DYTs and the people’s value of time increases speed of responsiveness of an centre agency to 
their request becomes crucial factor in decentralization. Deutsch and Kochen’s analysis is 
particularly relevant to overcome the views of those officials in Bhutan will believe that the 
expansion of communication facilities favour centralisation. With the  introduction of faster 
communication and transportation, they argue that the size of the country, already 
comparatively small, is becoming progressively smaller, and that duplicating decision-making 
units in the twenty districts is not cost-efficient. In their view, a single centralised planning 
and administration system that subordinates, but addresses the localities needs well should be 
perfected. Implicit in their assumption is that the centre can continue to enlarge its current 
limited processing capacity to respond at an effective rate to the districts and gewogs. Their 
assumption will exacerbate the male distribution of staff between the centre and the districts, 
which has less than 50 per cent of the civil service. More seriously, it ignores the lack of 
context based knowledge of resolving problems by being at the operational area and 
belonging to locality. The social and the environmental cost of congestion in the capital city is 
also hardly taken into account in this kind of argument. 
However, at the end, the primary goals of decentralization not efficiency and cost-
effectiveness, as supposed by Deutsch and Kochen (1969), is not consistent with the principle 
purposes of decentralization advocated as value pluralism and diversity. The objectives of 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness incline the process of decentralization towards purposes of 
spatial and functional decentralization. 
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From the point of view of rising cost of labour in rural areas, it is also relevant to relate 
a conception of decentralization that exist in some quarters of bureaucracy and beneficiary 
labour contributions in gewogs and dzongkhags. As an aside, the lack of such labour 
contributions in municipalities and towns provides a constrasting conditions in local 
governance units  between gewogs and municipalties, and maybe adding to the incentive to 
locate oneself in urban areas, and compounding the phenomena of ‘empty households’ in 
rural area.  
The perpetuation of self-help associations through  contribution of labour was an 
element in the official decentralization concept. This particular reasoning for decentralization 
was first evoked, though unstated so visibly and strongly, in an official thought in the early 
1980s.49 Labour contributions to local infrastructure development featured as an aspect of 
decentralization. Some officials took the view that scaling down of the local initiatives 
including labour contribution for maintenance of infrastructure such as irrigation channels and 
cantilever bridges would hobble the state eventually by overstretching its resources. 
Communities who expressed infrastructural needs could thus value more the joint investments 
into the infrastructure. Thus, the state conceived itself as a provider of capital while the 
beneficiaries would supply labour for a range of simple construction activities from which 
they would benefit. The perceived flaw in this argument was that the principle was not 
applied in urban areas, which is predominantly the environment of the commercial groups, 
where the the density of infrastruture formation is in fact the greatest as is the ability to 
contribute financially.  
If decentralization is a manner of promoting civic responsibilities, sense of membership 
of a polity, and means of cost sharing between the beneficiaries-users and the state in the 
gewogs, this purpose or objective is at risk in municipalities or urban areas where none of the 
features of obligations and participation in gewogs seem to apply. The residents within 
municipalities, or towns, are understandably engaged in different economic fields such as 
industries and services. But the role of such residents, probably richer than an average rural 
resident, with respect to these particular objectives of decentralization to revive civic 
responsibilities is ambiguous. In other words, there doesn't seem yet to be a conceptual 
framework that explains the urban life in terms of decentralization, and decentralization in 
terms of the urban life, besides voting for members of the municipal committee. For instance, 
how does principle of cost sharing between beneficiaries and the state in terms of labour 
contribution operating in gewogs applies in municipalities? How do other levies collected in 
gewogs apply in municipalities? A recent world bank mission noted that “urban areas are 
more dependent on RGOB grants than they should [be] given the level of economic activity 
observed in them. This means that for a given budget, less resources are available to rural 
areas where economic activity is low” (Vallaincourt, 2004). 
V. REPRESENTATION AND PARTICIPATION  
The normally held image of traditional societies is that they suffer from political apathy 
due to political centralisation. Anthropologists have argued that it is not only modern 
democratic states with a high level of social and economic capacity to enable citizens to be 
involved in political participation, but that pre-industrial societies show a high degree of 
political participation. In other words, it is argued that pre-industrial societies also display 
extensive participation, if we look beyond modern form of electoral activity and voting which 
are an outward expression of voice on issues.  
The substantive essence of voting is collective structure of decision making. How 
collective decision-making is actualized should be the main focus. A broad definition of 
political participation would be "efforts on the part of members of a community to influence, 
                                                 
49 Royal Civil Service Commission. 1981. Decentralization Strategy Paper.  
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either directly or indirectly, the authoritative allocation of values in the community (Ross, 
1988)," whereas defining political participation in electoral terms makes many prior 
assumptions about structures and processes of political participation. Thus defined, political 
participation can be measured by selecting suitable variables for both range and involvement 
in political participation in any society, traditional or modern. 
There is considerable likelihood that the members of GYTs and DYTs may get 
politicised by being nominated and sponsored by political parties once they are launched. I 
have argued elsewhere (Ura 2004) that the local government institutions should not be 
politicised. Political parties should not be allowed to interfere in these bodies. The local 
government institutions and elections to GYTs and DYTs could best operate without following 
party policy lines. Political parties should have no hands in nominating candidates to GYTs 
and DYTs. This arrangement, if institulized in election laws in the making, will lead to lack of 
explicit interconnections and interference between national political parties and GYTs and 
DYTs and preserve the integrity of GYTs and DYTs to respond to local interests and pressures 
instead of central political parties. This institutional arrangement will also decrease by one 
important factor the total domination of the political landscape by national political parties in 
a country where civil society of western kind is currently very weak.  
In this section I shall be focusing more on participation instead of representation. In 
representation, Bhutan could be among the countries having the highest number of elected 
representatives per 1000 adult voters in the gewog, district and national representational 
institutions. All representatives are elected/coopted as individuals or independents, except 
those moninated in ex officio capacity to the GYT or DYT.  
Representation has increased after the creation of GYTs and DYTs. The membership of 
GYTs in particular are drawn from each chiwog (a village or cluster of village grouped as a 
subdivision of a gewog) and therefore every group of villages is represented in their 
respective GYTs. Altogether, in 2004, there were 2614 representatives in 201 GYTs and 572 
represenatives in 20 DYTs. But the total number of representatives in these two local 
government institutions is not the sum of these two figures as the DYT members are partly 
composed of GYT members. There is no data on the number of GYTs and DYTs membership 
disaggregated at the gewog level. Nor do we know at this stage about the social and economic 
status of individuals who are members of GYTs and DYTs. 
It is not in representation of and in itself that is crucial in democracy or decentralization; 
it is in participation in various stages of decision-making that reflect democratic ideals. High 
political participation is often said to be associated with high social and economic and 
educational status of the participants, according to what has come to be understood variously 
as the socio-economic, resource, or mobilization hypothesis. It is argued that increasing 
resource level in a society boost the political participation of its members. Comparative 
studies find that both within and between countries, individuals endowed with higher resource 
are politically more active. Individuals get the desire and the skill to participate politically and 
build pressure from below to hold authorities accountable. Sustained participation in decision-
making by subsistence peasants, such as that of Bhutan, is certainly limited by the costliness 
their time diverted from daily preoccupations to secure their living, especially if they realize 
that their voices do not count at the end. But neither low level of resources among the 
peasantry nor preoccupations with daily farming routine need inhibit peasant participation 
when the decision-making process is structured to involve laypeople and the criteria of 
decision lend to their views and knowledge.  
Literacy has been particularly stressed as an important politically relevant prerequisite 
for enhancing political participation in social mobilization literature (Deutsch, 1961).50 In 
arguing for literarcy as a causal agent, Deutch was perhaps part of the school of thought 
                                                 
50 Deutsch selected literacy as one of the seven major variables in his index of social mobilization or 
modernization, which measures multiple correlation between seven of these variables. Social mobilization, he 
defines, as simply a label given to overall process of change. 
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demonstrating literacy not only as a different (read advanced) way of creating and storing 
knowledge but also as an agent of new social structures. However, such mobilisation 
hypothesis, pivoted on literacy as a crucial variable, does seem to ignore the nature of 
knowledge and learning among peasantry in oral preliterate or nonliterate societies, by failing 
to distinguish it from literacy and literate knowledge imparted in formal mass educational 
institutions. Yet such a distinction is important in the Bhutanese context of peasantry’s 
participation in decisions that is the aim of decentralization. Summarising various authors, 
Akinasso has questioned that literacy and literate knowledge necessarily equips individuals 
possessing them with greater cognitive capacities, as opposed to cognitive skills.  Akinasso 
argues that “… although literacy facilitates acquisition of certain cognitive skills and 
operations, it does not, in itself, engender novel cognitive capacities” (Akinnaso 1992, 70). 
The import of the argument on decentralization is that knowledge of peasantry living in 
largely nonliterate society of Bhutan may not be dismissed. Indeed, knowledge of the 
nonliterate society, characterised by practicality, particularism and contextualism makes it a 
suitable base for tapping in decentralization, as opposed to mass literacy and knowledge 
transmitted through formal institutions which is decontextualised and specialized, and laden 
with exotic lexicon of a foreign tongue and values of the far away national educationists (who 
are external to the community).51
The other approach to the study of political participation, especially in preindustrial 
societies, stresses not the level of resources, but the organisation of resources.52  In this 
hypothesis, what is more important is the structural forces or institutional patterns in a society. 
The institutional pattern consist of "the concentration of power and authority, the strength of 
cross-cutting social ties,… in a society". 53 These factors, according to resource-level 
hypothesis become the most important factors in political participation. In analytic terms, 
political participation has been bifurcated into involvement and range (Ross 1998). Range 
refers to the number of areas of life over which collective decisions are made. It relates to the 
question ‘what are the areas in which collective decisions are made?' Involvement refers to 
the number of people who makes the decision. It relates to the question 'who has participated 
in the decision?' Strong cross-cutting ties are positively related to involvement and range. 
Cross cutting ties, in which Bhutanese communities situated in the same physical space 
abound, provides informal institutional base for collective action mobilized through social and 
kinship connections, though such kinship affinities must be tempered by Buddhist broadening 
of concerns for all who are also not kins. Centralisation of power is inversely related to 
collective involvement and  range. Moreover, the range of decisions will be fundamentally 
limited if they are restricted only to administrative spheres. This fortunately is not the case 
with GYT and DYT acts where the range of decision is extended to a modest level into 
regulatory ‘general’ areas.  
                                                 
51  Lipset (1994) has prioritized social equality, competitive market economy, culture favorable to 
democracy, disassociation between political and religious communities, legitimacy, appropriate executive in 
electoral systems, existence of political and civil society as the main prerequisites for democracies. But these 
conditions seem to be what democracy  is rather than conditions for democracy. In any case, all of these 
variables are shown to be coorrelates rather than causes of democracy. Lipset, a promient current political 
scientist, did not touch on either the role of Buddhism, which is a determinant of Bhutanese culture, or on the 
importance of sub-national institutional arrangements for democracy in his list of social pre-requisites for 
democracy. 
52 Ross’s study (1988:79) of political participation in terms of range and involvement supported the 
organisation of resources hypothesis in a multivariate model (multiple regression). This result did not come 
through clearly at the bivariate tabulation.  
53 Ross, ibid., 75-76. 
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VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
The essay begin with a historical interpretation of the local-centre relationship 
demonstrating that the traditional polity of Bhutan had a decentralized authority. This is not 
merely an exercise to portray past to reflect current circumstances. The depiction of 
decentralized authority in traditional polity in Bhutan is not an exception in the Buddhist 
Himalayan political world. Although historical narrative of non-centralized state is dissonant 
with Western political theory, some scholars, for example Geoffrey Samuel 1992) 
characterised Tibet as a non-centralised state, with substantial autonomy left to local figures. 
However, decentralization has been necessary and natural in Bhutan because of its social and 
ecological diversity. Whether the decentralised authority in Bhutan was a factor in hundreds 
of years of stability is partly a matter of interpretation, but it can be argued that it was until the 
external factors in the form of British imperial interest changed the basic premises governing 
national stability and security. Paradoxically, even the defense of the country in olden times 
required more lateral and decentralised coordination compared to vertical coordination.54  The 
causes for decentralized authority in the traditional polity stemmed from several features of 
the country’s politics and geography. First, the structure of power exhibited various centres 
like the Zhabdrung incarnates,  penlops, druk desis, chief abbots, heads of private religious 
establishments, lineage based community authorities and so forth counter balancing each 
other. Second, in a state leadership and officialdom penetrated by the monk-statemen with 
classical Buddhist training,  centralization of power would have had very little appeal and 
value. Despite the lack of institutional design for check and balance like the modern 
seperation of power, Buddhism supported an individual pyschology of balance of power in 
the concept of mkyentse nus gsum (coherent equilibrating qualities of a leader in terms of 
knowledge, compassion and power). Power was to serve only to effect compassion and 
wisdom. Abrogation of power to an individual authority for its own sake is undermined by 
this Buddhist concept of the three supreme qualities of a leader. Third, the pervasive and 
centralizing presence of state in the communities was impossible because of the pedestrianism 
of Bhutanese society. Control of regulation of communities55 was circumscribed by sheer 
pedestrian cost. For heuristic purpose, a community can be functionally and territorially 
considered equivalent to a gewog, the main locus of collective decision-making and authority, 
both in the past and today. 
The fundamental effect of the nature of non-centralized state in the traditional polity in 
Bhutan was to encourage considerable degree of community autonomy and diversity. 
Individual autonomy in the standard liberalist sense is the mere absence of ‘illegal or 
unconstitutional’ coercion while making any choice. The term diversity can be best 
understood as it is done in ecological terms. “Diversity measures the resilience of a self-
sustaining ecosystem” (Hershock forthcoming book. Ch. 5). Diversity can be understood as 
the extent of  “interdependencies by means of which individual members contribute to each 
other's welfare,” materially, emotionally, and spiritually. Diversity is indeed necessary for us 
as individuals to contribute and be contributed to. When there is no diversity, there will be no 
space to contribute in any meaningful way to each other.  And it is only through the 
meaningful diversity and interdependence, ‘not mere co-existence’ as Hershock writes, that 
we can increase our welfare, which is always a relational matter. 
Diversity in traditional polity, which coincides with value pluralism to an extent, 
entailed to institutions controlling renewable resources, jural settlements based on customary 
laws, and customary property relationships that varied across the country. Clearly, there was 
far more diversity in every domain of human life due to lesser universally applied terms of 
                                                 
54 Food stocking and militia raising were done at a local level. Oral sources also maintain that fighting 
wnet on local command, 
55 I identify the community here with mainly territorial base, although it can also have a functional, 
associational, non-territorial locus.  
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decision making. The community was the main setting for the individual and his or her ideas 
and meanings, and the community’s social, religious and economic world constituted the self-
concept of its members. Individuals developed in their respective communities which, as 
Wilkinson argued, served as both means for achieving social well-being and end of its 
realization (cited in Summers 1986:355). One should add that this statement gives the 
impression of individual being reduced completely to community, while the Buddhist view is 
that an individual is a relational entity, and the community itself is a system of relationships 
without reality of its own. The community is a suitable pragmatic locus for practising and 
constituting meaningful and interdependent relationship because of its scale. All individuals 
and beings are, in Buddhism, part of an individual’s concern, but a community yields the best 
possible pragmatic field for meaningful interdependences. 56  But such an normative 
community that should be the object of state embracing diversity as a value is neither identical 
to a liberal community inhabited by the autonomous agents as rational choosers posited in 
liberalism nor to a communitarian community where individuals are bound insularly by 
common values as the basis of a community. Individuals are existentially grounded in their 
communities but their world-view is also borderlessly open and inclusive as they practice in 
these communities the values of compassion and interdependence encompassing all sentient 
beings.   
Decentralization in the context of liberalism is to enlarge the autonomy of individuals 
who are portrayed as independent, separate bearers of inalienable rights and choosers of ends.  
We need to realize that all choices are contingent and shaped by larger forces, and that 
choices are largely influenced, though not determined completely, by beliefs, by values and 
assumptions of the society we live in. It seems quite implausible, as poststructuralist have 
argued, that an individual can be autonomous in liberalism’s sense of the term as standing 
outside of society (Bevir 199:71-73; Foucault 1993: 201-203).57  Such criticism of autonomy 
does not apply for the subject as agent, in whom the poststructuralist see the capacity to act 
freely. This capacity is correlated to minimum of domination and toleration of difference 
These are part also of decentralization and diversity arguments and are can be linked to 
reduction of the normalisation58 and individualisation under modernity, a concept elaborated 
by Foucault (Bevir 199:74-76). Poststructuralist thought points to more a realistic assessment 
of the subject with regard to the question of autonomy but we need to depart from 
poststructuralism to be more situated in Bhutanl. It needs to be recalled here that the concept 
of lack of an autonomous subject (self) is suggestive of Buddhism which rejects it on grounds 
that it is made up the eight interactives aggregates of consciousness) which is constantly 
changing. It is argued that an illusion of self exist due to an illusion of self persisting through 
time, and that gives rise to itself as a seat of self-centredness (Kaptein 2000:115.59 However, 
                                                 
56 Meaningful interdependence in the context of Buddhist practice is elaborated by Peter Hershock (2005 
forthcoming Chapter 6. Diversity As Commons: International Relations Beyond Competition and Cooperation) 
57  Foucault (1993:202) remarked that “historians prefer a hisotry of social processes, and most 
philosophers prefer a subject without history” in the study of constitution of the subject over time. 
58 In what appears to be a key passage on normalisation and domination, Foucault (1993:203) says: 
“ But,analysing the experience of sexuality, I became more and more aware that these in all societies, I think, in 
all societies whatever they are, another type of techniques: techniques which permit individuals to effect, by their 
own means, a certain number of operations on their own bodies, on their own souls, on their own thoughts, on 
the own conduct, and this in a manner so as to transform themselves, modify themselves, and attain a certain 
state of perfection, of happiness, of purity, of supernatural power, and so on. Religious all of this kind of 
techniques a techniques or technology of the self… I think that if one wants to analyse the genealogy of the 
subject in Western civilisation, he has take into account not only techniques of domination but also techniques of 
the self .” Foucault (1993:204) suggests techniques of the self as “…the techniques oriented towards the 
discovery and the formulation of the truth concerning oneself...” He says that “the examination of on conscience 
and confessions are among the most important of this procedures.” 
59 Advanced teachings often include ngo sprod in order to instrospect on the mind itself: examining what 
it does by itself before techniques are learnt to calm it down and eliminate its activity to a minimum. At its 
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at a conventional level, Buddhism does not deny existence of an individual as life histories 
and identities; rather it points out that to take even such life histories and identities of 
individuals is mistaken because they are part of interdependent phenomena. 
While we need to enlarge human rights as the lowest or basic common bench marks for 
interrelationships, we need not accept reified existence of free and autonomous agents as 
given. Given the notion of subject as agent with capacity for freedom from normalization and 
domination, the need for freedom and human rights to undergird human dignity is the same 
whether one looks at individuals from any humanistic standpoints, including Buddhism. We 
can also agree with libertarian arguments that individual human rights are necessary as a 
common value for individuals not be bound unreflexively and involuntarily to a community. 
But a Buddhist caveat suggest that achievement of human rights is not in itself a cause for 
celebration. World would be much better if human rights were not needed, as Hershock has 
argued from a Buddhist perspective. The fact that they are so badly needed, in his words, “as 
a set of practices established to perform triage of emergency care for ailing societies” can only 
be contrued as “an indictment of society”60 of how we have failed to be aware of our 
interrelatedness and basic sympathy and compassion. The import of the Buddhist view of 
interdependencies, in which compassion and empathy is central, is that we need to cultivate 
values much beyond human rights, and such a possibility of practice seem more realistic in 
the setting of communities. At the same time, diversity of local institutions, freedom for 
diversity and relating to each other freely according to specific needs of the individuals seem 
more realistic in setting which do not atomize individuals in mass society.  
The preservation of communities with the help of clearly structured decision-making 
demarcating areas between the centre, communities and other intermediate entities is crucial 
to diversity as a value. And these are equally valid reasons in the present efforts of the 
government seeking for a balance between vertical and horizontal intergration, although it 
must be recognized that the nature and complexity of decisions in a modern state means that a 
considerable range of decisions will be reserved to the centre. A general problem in the 
context of preserving community is that competitive market conditions that is spreading 
everywhere associated with globalization and political liberalism do not give incentive for 
individuals to be committed to their community and the community to be viable for the 
individuals. Liberalism’s or enlightenment view of knowledge as objective knowledge of the 
world, and therefore universally applicable, might be another factor prejudicial to the survival 
of communities and their diversity. In that sense, opposite poststructuralist insight that all 
knowledge are contextual and local offers another advantage to the preservation of 
communities, for the existence of communities might in no small measure depend on 
accommodation of particularistic and contextual indigenous knowledges and cultures.  
His Majesty the King Jigme Singye Wangchuck’s (reign 1972-) vision of a political 
community in the context of Gross National Happiness combined with historical and cultural 
compatibility of decentralized authority resulted in the modern phase of political restructuring 
of the centre-local relationship. In comparison with developing nations in general, the 
initiative of His Majesty the King went back as early as 1981, when he established a 
representative institution - district development committees  - to resolve collective political 
and economic issues through discourse, at least a decade ahead of the OECD adoption of 
participatory development as goal of aid in 1990. In programmatic terms, His Majesty insisted 
that the operational unit of planning and management and documentation of plans should not 
be sectoral and national, but local to prevent vertical integration and blurring of specifities of 
plans that lend diversity to communities. The localisation of planning and documentation at 
                                                                                                                                                        
limiting case, contemplation is supposed to make it free from phenomenal reality. Some say that it is the moment 
when wisdom quality which may be identified with compassion and borderless openess dawns. 
60 This view though sounding extreme actually accords well with how democracies based on human rights 
come about as a result of truce after inconclusive fighting for dominance between various groups (Flybjerg 
1998:226 citing Herschman 1994:208). 
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the district and gewog levels to permit fine-grained view of activities and budgets so that the 
small scale communities can keep sight and control of what might otherwise get aggregated, 
reduced, and centralized into national sectoral plans. Aggregation into larger systems may 
come at the cost of shifting of coordination and accountability from the local towards the 
central. Likewise, having to align with every standard and criteria laid down by the centre can 
only come with a degree of trade off with local creativity, resilience and innovation which are 
usually sustained under diversity. 
In the literature of decentralization, there is excessive reference to the need for 
participatory planning and management and very little on creation of regulatory space. 
Activating participatory planning and management within prior set of regulations, criteria, 
norms passed by the centre often sets narrow limits to the discourse and actions of the locals. 
Local choices and creativity then have to be exerted within ranges specified by uniform 
central rules, legislation and directives. Devolving administrative and associated financial 
authority will allow for locals to decide, for example with reference to a structure, on 
dimension of choices such as where to build it (spatial choice), when to build it (temporal 
choice) and what to be given priority among the various  needs (prioritization choice). But all 
three of them belong not so much to conception and design of an activity, which is the true 
mark of a local initiative, as to implementation stage. In this hypothetical example, centralised 
design preempts true local authorship of the activity and the aim of decentralized polity as a 
response to diversity of design to fit local ecological, resources and skills is made untenable. 
The thrust of this hypothetical case, which can be extended to many different activities, is that 
the ultimate success of decentralisation and participatory planning will be heightened by 
giving more regulatory rooms might be more effective than devolving a great deal of 
administrative powers. Regulatory space is the undecided, clean space (tabula rasa) in that a 
decentralized unit can set rules and criteria for and by itself. Incipient forms of decentralized 
regulatory powers are already granted to local representative institutions like GYTs and DYTs. 
The introduction of regulatory powers in some domains promote the environment and 
knowledge for communities to practice small rule and policy making for their own localities 
while providing ooportunities for training to enter bigger discussion on national policies and 
laws. There value for allowing certain areas of regulation-making to be decentralized has been 
borne in several instances where the centre has followed pioneering steps taken in the districts. 
As lateral learning process deepen through decentralization, there will be many innovations 
and solutions bubbling up from the communities. The benefits of diverse new solutions 
communities find can only be shared if they are surveyed and documented for diffusion.  
Like regulatory powers, devolution of financial powers is another indicator of 
decentralization. The pattern of spending in 2002-2003 fiscal year, which was also the first 
year of the implementation of the new decentralization laws,  show that 17 percent of total 
spending was channeled through the districts and gewogs. The rest was spent directly by the 
central agencies. This pattern will certainly change progressively in favour of the districts and 
gewogs. Yet a substantial shift cannot take place until the government become self-reliant in 
both recurrent and capital expenditures through dramatic revenue enhancement based on 
mega-investments like the hydro-power exploitation. Contrary to arguments and expectations 
of external observers on decentralization, decentralization should not be perceived, at least for 
the foreseeable future, as a way for all gewogs to generate enough revenue to cover all types 
of recurrent budget, let alone capital budget. The tax and population bases, which may be 
declining in  some gewogs affected by migration, makes that infeasible without  incurring 
great human costs. His Majesty the King has rightly and benevolently curtailed an increase in 
rural cash taxes. And were locally decided cash taxes to rise significantly in gewogs without 
concommittant lowering of a spectrum of locally organized and decided labour contributions, 
it would add to the push factors of urban bound migration. The current level of labour 
contribution to build community facilities and carryout other communal tasks may be huge, in 
that it negatively impacts agriculture and livestock and household management, in certain 
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gewogs. Labour contributions to build communal infrastructure not only benefits the 
contributors directly, but people yet to be borne. Thus, it is a part of nation building to make 
future generate inherit a greater level of assets. Indeed, economically speaking, such sacrifices 
for nation building either in cash or labour contributions have to be placed increasingly also 
on urban populations who may have greater capacity to bear them. As labour contributions to 
maintenance and creation of infrastructure in gewogs is an important issue in decentralisation, 
the issue needs closer examination.61  
The commitment and pace of Bhutanese government to decentralization and diversity is 
hindered by lack of human, financial and technological resources. With as many as 201 
gewogs institutions (GYTs) to be strengthened, investment on this wide front is thin. If a 
sustained progress is to be made at the same time in all GYTs, it can realistically be done only 
with substantial support of Bhutan’s development partners. The current pattern of spending 
which show higher spending by the centre compared to the districts and gewogs, as 
mentioned earlier, is a consequence of the lack of revenue self-sufficiency and subtle 
processes and pre-conditions of aid that favour agglomeration of donor assisted project 
coordination units at the centre as well as programming of activities that may ingeniously 
diverge from local financial authority. If aid money is to respond directly to local choices, 
priority identified by communities need to be respected without questioning fundamentally 
the choices and preferences of people. But the donor assistance portofolio, set according to 
strategic priorities, out of which resources are allocated, do impart a conformist tendency way 
down to the locals. Decentralisation and diversity requires free commitment of resources, 
given to the government in many decentralized sectors, of which spending can be prioritized 
by the locals. The dynamics of centre-donor negotiations may lead to devising supra-district 
programmes associated to regions, circles, eco-zones, circles, themes, etc,. As a consequence, 
these lead to budget retention above the districts and gewogs  entities in project management 
units where such supra-district projects precipitates comparatively concentrated opportunities 
for foreign travel, office automation and other comforts of working life. The management of 
supra-district programmes at the centre are often defended on efficiency grounds, but such 
efficiency may be far less defensible when their spillover social, demographic, political and 
economic impacts are viewed from a wider perspective. The cost of congestion and 
overcrowding at the centre, maldistribution of staffing between the centre and the local, the 
decrease in the speed of responsiveness to local requests relatives to rise in the value of 
waiting time of the locals, lack of context based knowledge at the centre to resolve issues at 
the site are some of the potential drawbacks when seen from a wider perspective.       
The last issue that I wish to touch here is the political discourse among the peasantry in 
decentralized decision-making and the need for sensitivity to local knowledges in the decision 
making structure. There is a tendency in the literature on decentralization to view literacy and 
other resource levels as crucial to political participation. If the pre-requisites were true, a lack 
of these pre-requisites in the predominantly nonliterate society in Bhutan forestalls effective 
partipation among the peasantry as well as their political representatives (DTY and GYT 
members) whose world view and cognitive capacities may not be different from the peasantry. 
An overemphasis on mass literacy and mass knowledge transmitted through formal 
educational institutions is indeed a bias on its own that does not recognize fairly the different 
nature of learning and knowledge in a nonliterate society. In the context of decentralization 
and diversity, nonliterate communities’s knowledge and skills characterised by practicality, 
particularism and contextualism offers rich bases for self-mobilization. They are also the 
framework within which decisions by the locals are partly made. Here again, if all the local 
decisions have to conform strictly and dissolve into expert-led technological and scientific 
criterion made by the centre, such preconditions will preclude local participation as well as 
broader local foundation of decisions that should encompass aesthetic and moral values; and 
                                                 
61 A preliminary paper on the variety and quantity of labour as revealed by a survey carried out in early 
2004 contributions will be forthcoming in early 2005. 
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locally relevant knowledges. On the whole, however, better decisions are made on the basis of 
values than on the basis of technical and scientific criterion alone. 
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